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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Nature of Conglomerate Mergers 
The first step in commencing a study of conglomerate mergers must 
be to reach an understanding of what exactly is a "conglomerate merger." 
Because the term has become part of common language, it is seldom pre­
cisely defined. 
For purposes of this study, a merger is defined as the unifying 
of control of two companies formerly under separate control. The 
primary connotation of the term "conglomerate" in reference to a bus­
iness firm is that the firm is engaged in diversified activities. How­
ever, the concept of "diversification" is itself imprecise, since 
virtually every firm is "diversified" to the extent that production of 
any good or service requires more than one operation. A manufacturer 
of shirts, for example, generally is involved, at the least, in the cut­
ting of fabric, the stitching of the shirts, and the packaging of the 
final product. Thus, it would be more accurate to refer to a firm as 
diversified if it is involved in activities that are often performed by 
separate firms. 
It is conventional to define such diversification as "vertical" in 
nature if the different activities are related stages in the production 
of a good or service; an example would be the drilling, refining, and 
distribution stages of home heating oil. A firm engaging in such ac­
tivities is generally referred to as "vertically integrated" rather 
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than diversified, in order to convey more precise information, namely, 
that the different activities are related in a vertical fashion. Another 
form of diversification is found in a firm that produces one product 
and sells that product in two or more geographically distinct markets. 
This situation is not often referred to as diversification, although it 
is consistent with the term as explained above and with Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) merger classifications (FTC 1981, pp. 102-3). A firm 
whose diversified activities are neither vertically related nor simply 
geographically differentiated is in general referred to simply as "diver­
sified." That use of the term is employed in this study. 
The term conglomerate, as it is used in the literature, implies 
diversification in the above sense. However, a further refinement is 
sometimes employed, reseirving the term for firms that achieve rapid 
growth via the acquisition of other firms in "unrelated" industries. In 
other words, "conglomerate" sometimes connotes not simply diversifica­
tion, but rapid diversification by means of numerous diversifying 
mergers. Such a distinction can be useful, due to the potentially dif­
fering effects of diversifying acquisitions, as opposed to a firm 
developing different product lines and services with its own resources; 
the latter means of diversification is often referred to as internal 
diversification. Although these differing effects will be discussed in 
this dissertation, this study has as its focus the effects of diversi­
fication via mergers. Since some of the mergers studied did not involve 
"conglomerates" in the narrow sense just discussed, the terms "diversi­
fied firm," "a firm diversifying via conglomerate merger," and 
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"conglomerate" are used Interchangeably in this study. 
With the preceding discussion of diversification, it is possible 
to attach theoretical and empirical meaning to the term "conglomerate 
merger." As an abstraction, the term will be used to denote a merger 
in which the "surviving" (i.e., post-merger) firm is more diversified 
then were both of the pre-merger firms individually. Thus, it is not 
necessary for either pre-merger firm to be diversified in order for 
their merger to be classified as "conglomerate." 
For empirical purposes, FTC merger classifications will be employed 
(FTC 1981, pp.. 102-3). The Commission identifies mergers as being 
"horizontal" (between firms in the same product and geographic market), 
"vertical" (between firms with an actual or potential buyer/seller 
relationship), or "conglomerate" (all mergers that are neither horizontal 
nor- vertical). The conglomerate mergers are further classified by the 
FTC as "market extension," "product extension," or "other." These 
distinctions are made on the basis of whether the merging firms produce 
the same product for different geographic markets (market extension), 
different but related products (product extension), or essentially 
unrelated products (other). (See Chapter IV for further discussion of 
these classifications.) In accord with the preceding definition of 
diversification, "conglomerate mergers" will herein refer to the "prod­
uct extension" and "other" categories only, unless otherwise noted. 
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B. The Incidence of Conglomerate Mergers in Recent Years 
The FTC publishes data on the number and nature of mergers in 
which the acquired firm is in the manufacturing or mining sector and 
has assets of $10 million or more on the date of acquisition (FTC 1981). 
(See Chapter IV for further discussion of these data.) The data span 
the years 1948-79, and in each of these years at least one conglomerate 
merger is identified. However, the significant aspect of the data for 
present purposes is the larger proportion of all large mergers that 
are classified as conglomerate in the middle and latter years of the 
period as compared to the early years. (See Table 1.) Dividing the data 
into convenient decade groupings, the percentages of all large mergers 
that were conglomerate mergers are 52% for 1948-59, 75% for 1960-69, 
and 72% for 1970-79. During the six-year conglomerate merger "wave" 
of 1966-71, fully 82% of all large mergers were conglomerate in nature. 
Although conglomerate merger activity subsided somewhat in the following 
three years, the last five years of the 1970s saw the percentage rise 
back to the 75% level. 
There are undoubtedly many reasons for the marked increase in 
conglomerate mergers during the past three decades, including financial 
and tax advantages. Although it is not the purpose of this study to 
investigate and analyze the various factors underlying the increase in 
such mergers, one factor seems sufficiently clear and important to 
warrant mention, namely, the antitrust environment of the period. In 
1950, the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
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strengthened that act's provision restricting mergers that may have 
an adverse impact on competition. As discussed in more detail later 
in this chapter, the amended act, and subsequent court decisions inter­
preting it in the early 1960s, closed many horizontal and vertical 
avenues to firms with an urge to merge. The congressional hearings 
on the Celler-Kefauver amendment make clear that the Congress intended 
conglomerate mergers to fall within the purview of the act (Narver 1967, 
Chapter III), and several court decisions of the middle-1960s affirmed 
this fact. However, it was less likely that a diversifying acquisition 
would be held to adversely affect competition than would a horizontal 
or vertical merger. This became even more apparent with the 1974 
U.S. V. Marine Bancorporation et al. decision (418 U.S. 602), after 
which conglomerate merger activity once again increased. 
Whatever the reasons for the observed increase of conglomerate 
mergers, it is the possible effects of conglomerate mergers that are 
the focus of this study. The following section briefly discusses such 
effects. 
C. Possible Economic Effects of Conglomerate Mergers 
1. Increased aggregate concentration 
Many of those concerned about conglomerate mergers emphasize the 
effect these mergers may have on "aggregate concentration" in the U.S. 
economy. As an abstract concept, aggregate concentration refers to the 
extent to which a relatively small number of economic agents or units 
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own or control private sector resources. Various measures of aggregate 
concentration have been constructed, and they include the percentage 
of assets, sales, value-added, or employment accounted for by the 
largest 50, 100, 200, or 1,000 firms in some population such as 1 
U.S. corporations or all manufacturing corporations. 
That there exists no consensus regarding the effect of conglom­
erate mergers on aggregate concentration is hardly surprising, given 
the lack of agreement concerning two more fundamental questions: 
1) Is aggregate concentration important? and, 2) What has been the 
direction of change in aggregate concentration in recent years? 
With respect to the first question, some economists would agree 
with Benston (1980) that the concept of aggregate concentration is 
"a meaningless tool with respect to the existence of economic power" 
(p. 60). The basis for this view is that the important consideration 
is the size of a given firm relative to other firms in each market in 
which the firm competes, and not its absolute size (or, its size rel­
ative to all firms). 
An alternative view is that large diversified firms, with easier 
access to credit markets, have a financial leverage that can result in 
enhanced power in their individual markets (Scherer 1980, p. 104). In 
other words, absolute size per se confers special economic advantages 
that may increase a firm's relative power and/or size within a market. 
Also, to the extent that such firms are diversified, their size may 
enable them to take advantage of other effects of diversification dis­
cussed below. 
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Regardless of the economic importance of firm size, there may be 
political and social ramifications that warrant concern. Such possi­
bilities include the greater political influence that may be associated 
with the control of more economic resources, the reduction in the number 
of independent voices from the business community that results from 
fewer, larger firms, and the effects on local communities of having 
"local" businesses headquartered In distant cities. Empirical testing 
of these possibilities is, of course, difficult, though in recent years 
an increasing number of attempts have been made (for example, Plttman 
1976 and Marx 1982). Certainly, no consensus exists regarding the 
existence or significance of such adverse effects. However, one ob­
server, who is most skeptical regarding any adverse political and social 
implications of firm size, acknowledges that those considerations are 
"Perhaps the principal concern of the supporters of legislation to 
forclose mergers of large corporations..." (Benston 1980, p. 55). 
If the economic, political and social effects of aggregate con­
centration are subject to debate, so, to a lesser degree, is the recent 
trend in aggregate concentration. Depending on the data base employed 
and the interpretation of that data, one may conclude that concentration 
in the post- World War II era has been stable over time (Benston 1980, 
pp. 55-59), tended to Increase (Backman 1970, p. 129), or is "high 
and ever-increasing" (U.S. Department of Justice 1979, p. 1). (The 
latter two conclusions, while not inconsistent, do reflect different 
subjective impressions of the seriousness of the perceived Increases in 
concentration.) However, the range of these interpretations is not 
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large, compared with the different views regarding either the signif­
icance of aggregate concentration trends or, what is more germane to 
the present study, the role of conglomerate mergers in those trends. 
At one end of the spectrum of thought regarding mergers and 
aggregate concentration is Benston (1980). He argues that the merger 
activity of recent years has "in no way materially affected the level 
of aggregate concentration" (p. 60), largely because he considers that 
level to have been stable throughout the period of merger activity. 
A slightly less sanguine view is taken by Steiner (1975), who 
reviews several empirical studies and concludes that "the phenomenon 
of the large firm is thus not exclusively or primarily a product of 
the large merger" (p. 301). Steiner concedes that mergers are "an 
important source of upward mobility" for firms below the "largest 200" 
category, but contends that, especially for larger firms, internal 
sources of growth play a more important role (Steiner 1975, p. 299). 
Shenefield does not rank internal expansion and mergers as to 
their importance in the growth record of large firms, stating simply 
that "large conglomerate mergers contribute significantly to economic 
concentration" (U.S. Department of Justice 1979, p. 1). This view is 
certainly not inconsistent with that of Steiner (1975). However, 
Shenefield is more concerned than is Steiner about this aspect of 
conglomerate mergers partly because, unlike internal growth, mergers 
"are identifiable, discrete events on which the law may focus" (U.S. 
Department of Justice 1979, p. 1). Like Shenefield, Mueller (1977) 
contends that if such large mergers had been prevented, the level of 
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aggregate concentration would be "significantly lower," and may have 
declined during the periods of economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s 
(pp. 337-39). 
For purposes of this study, it is not necessary to reconcile, or 
choose between, conflicting views of issues surrounding aggregate 
concentration. Rather, it is sufficient to note that some evidence 
can be interpreted to indicate that conglomerate mergers have resulted 
in levels of concentration higher than might otherwise exist, and that 
there may be economic and/or political-social reasons to be concerned 
about any such effects of conglomerate mergers. Thus, these consid­
erations should be borne in mind when considering the policy implications 
of this study. 
2. Loss of market information 
In a market economy, information regarding the profitability of 
alternative uses of resources is crucial for the efficient allocation 
of those resources. Under conditions of competition, resources will 
tend to be moved out of activities that generate below average rates 
of profit and into activities that generate, or are expected to generate, 
above average rates of profit (abstracting from differing levels of risk 
associated with the different activities). Diversified fiirms interfere 
with this process of market allocation of resources, to the extent 
that their profits are reported only on a company or divisional basis. 
Typical of this problem are nine conglomerate firms studied by 
the FTC (1972). Varying amounts of detail concerning sales and profits 
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of these companies were found in their annual reports, but none of the 
firms provided a breakdown of invested capital or total assets on even 
a divisional basis. Furthermore, for the most part, sales and profit 
"detail" consisted of heterogeneous groupings of products "far too 
broad to be economically meaningful in a product sense" (FTC 1972, 
p. 119). The FTC study chose one of these firms as a "test case" for 
an in-depth search of other public sources for more useful and detailed 
profit information; none was found. It is also significant that of the 
53 divisions shown publicly by the nine firms in the FTC study, none 
reported losses. However, the much more detailed internal records 
kept by the firms and provided to the FTC showed losses in 79 of 361 
divisions (FTC 1972, p. 121). Focusing on the eight largest of these 
divisions for each conglomerate, nine of 72 reported losses (FTC 1972, 
p. 122). The study concluded that the public "divisional reporting 
by conglomerates functions more as a public relations device for man­
agement than as a guide to resource allocation, or as a means of pro­
tecting investors" (FTC 1972, p. 119). 
The dearth of information necessary for stockholders, investors, 
and potential industry entrants to make optimal decisions may well 
result in an inefficient allocation of resources. The problem is not 
due to conglomerates per se; rather, it results from the combination 
of increasing firm diversification and the lack of requirements for 
firms to report relevant market information at the level of economically 
meaningful products and/or industries. However, lacking such require­
ments, it is clear that conglomerate mergers can only serve to exacer­
bate the problem of "imperfect information." 
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3. Loss of potential competitors 
A final concern regarding conglomerate mergers that will not be 
substantively addressed in this study, but merits a brief discussion 
at this point, is that of potential competition. As Steiner explains, 
"potential competition," as it relates to conglomerate mergers, is an 
elusive concept with many interpretations (Steiner 1975, pp. 257-58). 
For present purposes it will suffice to offer two broad meanings of 
the term. One refers to the effect that a firm acknowledged to be a 
potential entrant into an industry may have on the behavior of firms 
currently in that industry. If the industry is characterized by a 
degree of oligopolistic co-operation, the established firms, in an 
attempt to discourage entry by other firms, may hold prices below the 
level that would otherwise prevail. If the most likely de novo entrant 
(or one of the few most likely entrants) acquires a firm in the industry, 
the rationale for the established firms to restrain prices to limit 
entry will have been removed, and prices may subsequently rise. (For a 
discussion of theories relating to such "limit pricing," see Scherer 
(1980, pp. 232-52).) 
A second sense in which a conglomerate merger can be said to 
reduce potential competition is more straightforward. A firm may enter 
an industry de novo, which (ceteris paribus) results in an increase in 
the number of firms in the industry, or it may enter via merger, in 
which case the number of firms in the industry is not changed. Entry 
via merger, then, results in fewer firms in an industry than does 
de novo entry. If a given firm would, in fact, enter de novo absent 
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the possibility of entry by acquisition, and if the number of firms 
and the degree of competition in an industry are positively related, 
then entry by that firm via merger results in a loss of potential 
competition. Related to this argument is the fact that de novo entry 
expands production capacity in an industry, which could result in 
increased output and decreased price in that industry. Thus, de novo 
entry could move an oligopolistic or monopolistic industry closer to 
the price/quantity combination that would prevail under perfect compe­
tition. Again, this potential competition is foregone when entry 
occurs via merger. 
As with most topics related to conglomerate mergers, controversy 
surrounds the theoretical and practical importance of the relationship 
between such mergers and their alleged effects on behavior in markets 
through a loss of potential competitors. Empirical testing of the 
various theories is at best difficult, and at worst intractable, in­
volving as it does such intangibles as firms' intentions and alterna­
tive pricing actions that would otherwise have occurred.^  
4. Effects on market shares of acquired firms 
The three possible effects of conglomerate mergers discussed up 
to this point have been relevant to, but generally beyond the scope 
of, the present study. Their inclusion in this introductory chapter 
A^ means for empirically testing theories of potential competition 
in the banking Industry is discussed in Bhoades (1975). 
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is meant to make the reader aware of the rather limited focus of the 
potential effects of conglomerate mergers analyzed in subsequent chap­
ters. This perspective is especially Important for drawing policy 
implications from the empirical results presented in Chapter V. 
The potential effects of conglomerate mergers upon which this 
study focuses are ones that may affect the market share of a firm 
acquired in a merger. Since such potential effects are discussed at 
some length in Chapter II, they will be only briefly mentioned at 
this juncture. 
Two practices that, in theory, may lead to an increase in the 
market share of an acquired firm are reciprocal buying agreements (or, 
reciprocity) and cross-subsidization. Reciprocity refers to the situ­
ation where two companies agree to purchase each others' products; 
cross-subsidization occurs when a firm uses revenues earned in one of 
its (geographic or product) markets to subsidize activities (sales, 
advertising, etc.) in another of its markets. It has been argued that 
conglomerate mergers enhance the possibility of these practices, al­
though the theoretical and empirical bases for these arguments are 
tenuous enough to have stirred much debate. 
Aside from the possibilities for reciprocity and cross-subsidi­
zation arising, Edwards (1955; 1970) contends that when large diversified 
firms meet in several markets an attitude of "mutual forbearance" may 
develop between them, each eschewing price coiiq>etition in each market 
for fear of retaliation in other markets. If such a "live and let live" 
attitude develops, the result might be a stabilization of the firms' 
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market shares in the markets in which they meet. Though this theory 
is the subject of less theoretical and empirical analysis in the liter­
ature than other aspects of conglomerate mergers, both cautious support 
and vigorous opposition relating to it can be found. 
Finally, the effects, if any, of conglomerate mergers on the 
production efficiency of the acquired and acquiring firms must be 
considered. Plausible arguments can be made that diversifying acquisi­
tions will tend to increase production efficiency, for example by 
replacing poor managers or allowing scale economies of joint production 
to be realized. Alternatively, it may be that conglomerate mergers 
reduce production efficiency, for example due to managerial diseconomies. 
Such efficiency changes could affect the pricing or other policies, 
and hence the market shares, of acquired and/or acquiring firms. In 
terms of their importance to this study, possible efficiency effects 
lie somewhere between the "related but tangential" concerns of aggregate 
concentration, information loss, and potential competition, and the 
"primary considerations" of reciprocity, cross-subsidization, and 
mutual forbearance. This is so because the efficiency effects stemming 
from conglomerate mergers are important (and oft-studied) concerns 
themselves, and yet any such effects that do occur would be reflected 
in the data used in this study. Therefore, the theory and evidence 
relating to the efficiency effects of conglomerate mergers are discussed, 
if briefly, in Chapter II in conjunction with those aspects of conglom­
erate mergers with which this study is primarily concerned. 
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D. Conglomerate Mergers in Antitrust Law 
1. Amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
The key provision of American antitrust law relating to mergers 
is Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Section 7 of the original Clayton Act, 
passed by Congress in 1914, proscribed the acquisition by a company of 
the stock of another company if the effect of the acquisition may be to 
substantially lessen competition between the two companies or to tend 
to create a monopoly. The act had no bearing on diversifying acquisi­
tions, focusing as it did on mergers between direct competitors. In 
fact, it had little effect on any merger activity, since the acquisition 
of the assets of a firm was not prohibited regardless of the relation­
ship between the merging firms. 
Recognizing the ineffectiveness of the Clayton Act in preventing 
mergers. Congress passed the Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950. This act 
amended Section 7 to bring asset acquisitions under the jurisdiction 
of the Clayton act and to broaden the range of proscribed mergers to 
include those that, in the words of the amendment, "may in any line of 
commerce in any section of the country...substantially lessen competi­
tion or tend to create a monopoly." This new phrasing replaced wording 
in the original act that limited application of Section 7 to direct 
competitors, and thus arose the possibility of conglomerate mergers 
running afoul of the law. 
Although twelve years passed before the Supreme Court handed down 
a comprehensive decision under the amended Section 7 (Neale 1970, 
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p. 183), merger opponents found their patience rewarded by the court's 
application of the new law. In the Brown Shoe Co. decision (370 U.S. 
294 (1962)) and subsequent decisions in the mid-1960s, the court made 
it increasingly difficult for horizontal and vertical acquisitions by 
large firms to survive tests of legality (Steiner 1975, p. 155). Many 
observers, such as Steiner (1975) and Dean (1970), credit this stance with 
being an important cause of the dramatic increase in the number of 
conglomerate mergers that occurred in the latter years of the 1960s. 
Though this argument is likely correct, conglomerate mergers themselves 
were subjected to increased scrutiny for antitrust violations by the 
court beginning in 1965. The concern was that such mergers "may 
substantially lessen competition" through the increased probability 
of such practices as reciprocity, cross-subsidization, or the loss of 
potential competition, as the following discussion of five important 
conglomerate merger cases indicates. 
Reciprocity was the focus of the first conglomerate merger case 
to come before the Supreme Court (Neale 1970, p. 191), in FTC v. 
Consolidated Foods Corp. et al. (380 U.S. 592 (1965)). The FTC found 
that Consolidated, a large wholesaler and retailer of processed foods, 
had violated Section 7 by purchasing Gentry, Inc., a manufacturer of 
dehydrated onion and garlic. The argument was that Consolidated could 
exert pressure on its suppliers to purchase from Gentry in order to 
maintain their business relationships with Consolidated. Refusing to 
rely on the post-merger record (which provided conflicting evidence 
relating to reciprocity), the court sustained the FTC decision on the 
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basis of a substantial probability that the merger would result in anti­
competitive reciprocity. A concurring, but weaker, opinion written by 
Justice Stewart provided the basis for several subsequent government 
defeats in conglomerate merger cases involving the potential for 
reciprocity. The court's current view of the reciprocity that might 
result from conglomerate mergers is not entirely clear (Steiner 1975, 
pp. 244-48). 
In the 1967 Procter and Gamble decision (386 U.S. 568), both the 
issues of cross-subsidization and potential competition were raised 
as the result of Procter and Gamble's acquisition of Clorox Chemical 
Company, the leading manufacturer of household liquid bleach. This 
product extension merger was challenged by the FTC due to the concen­
trated nature of the bleach market, the dominant position of Clorox 
in that market, and the possibility that subsequent to the merger 
Clorox's dominance would be further strengthened. The Supreme Court 
upheld the FTC ruling, noting that Procter's ability to bring to bear in 
the bleach market its enormous resources, especially its advertising 
budget and its profits from other markets to finance cross-subsidization, 
might dissuade smaller competitors from aggressively competing in the 
market. Although the cross-subsidization aspect of the case was prom­
inent in the court's decision, such "deep pocket" arguments have not 
played a major role in subsequent conglomerate merger decisions (Scherer . 
1980, p. 560). 
Of more enduring importance was the court's finding that Procter 
and Gamble was a potential de novo entrant to the bleach industry prior 
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to the merger, exerting "considerable influence" on the market behavior 
of firms in that industry. The loss of this moderating influence was 
an additional reason cited for disallowing the merger. The loss of a 
potential competitor had figured in previous court decisions, such as 
U.S. V. El Paso Natural Gas Co. et al. (376 U.S. 651 (1964)), but the 
application of the doctrine to conglomerate mergers clearly represented 
a fortification of the antitrust arsenal to be used against such mergers. 
After several lower court decisions disallowing conglomerate 
mergers on potential competition grounds (Steiner 1975, p. 269), the 
Supreme Court, in U.S. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. et al. (410 U.S. 526 
(1973)) and U.S. v. Marine Bancorporation et al. (418 U.S. 602 (1974)), 
imposed more difficult burden of proof requirements to stop mergers on 
those grounds. Essentially, the new court guidelines require evidence 
that the existence of a potential competitor in fact tempered oligop­
olistic pricing behavior before the merger can be disallowed on a 
"loss of potential competition" basis. Not surprisingly, the government 
subsequently lost a number of successive cases brought against mergers 
on potential competition grounds (Scherer 1980, p. 562). 
One aspect of conglomerate merger law related to potential compe­
tition, but not yet addressed by the Supreme Court, concerns the acqui­
sition of a firm with a small market share in a concentrated market, 
referred to as a "toe-hold" acquisition. In Bendix Corp. v. FTC (450 
F. 2nd 534 (1971)), the appeals court struck down the acquisition of 
Fram Corporation by Bendix on the basis of Fram's 17.2% share of the 
concentrated automotive oil filter market and Bendix's position as a 
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potential entrant. (Note that this decision was reached prior to the 
Falstaff and Marine Bancorporation decisions.) However, the court 
clearly stated that had Bendix entered the industry via a toe-hold acqui­
sition, it would not have violated Section 7, since such a merger "may be 
as economically desirable and beneficial to competition as internal 
expansion into a relevant market..." (450 F. 2nd 534 (1971, p. 536)). 
Their reasoning was that a firm such as Bendix could use its resources 
to allow a relatively small firm in a market to expand its market share 
and inject aggressive competition into a competitively stagnant oligop­
olistic market. Furthermore, the court noted that if significant 
barriers to de novo entry exist in an industry, a toe-hold acquisition 
might be the only way of introducing new competition to the industry. 
Thus, the defense of certain conglomerate mergers as being pro-competitive 
was accepted into judicial case law. Considering the Falstaff and Marine 
Bancorporation decisions, and the apparently diminished importance 
accorded to the possibilities of reciprocity and cross-subsidization, 
conglomerate mergers may be said to currently be subject to relatively 
gentle treatment under U.S. antitrust law. 
2. Proposed changes in the legal status of conglomerate mergers 
The controversy over the effects of conglomerate mergers has, 
predictably, sparked a controversy relating to the legal status of such 
mergers. On the one hand are proposals to restrict the occurrence of 
conglomerate mergers. The report issued in 1969 by a task force com­
missioned by President Johnson (the "Neal Report") recommended that 
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mergers between large firms and leading firms in concentrated markets 
should be prohibited under new legislation (Warren 1975, p. 289). This 
recommendation was made at a time when the Justice Department, under 
its then existing conglomerate merger guidelines (Neale 1970, pp. 503-5), 
was pursuing its most vigorous prosecution to this date against 
such mergers. As the conglomerate merger "wave" of the late 1960s 
subsided, so did calls for legislative action to oppose diversifying 
acquisitions. The renewed merger activity of the mid-to-late 1970s 
led to a renewal of the push for public policy changes. In 1979, the 
Justice Department called for "effective, yet flexible" legislation, 
noting that "major social, political and competitive concerns raised 
by conglomerate mergers are beyond the reach of existing law" (U.S. 
Department of Justice 1979, p. 21 and p. 31). Such proposals were 
introduced by the Department of Justice, the FTC, and Senator Edward 
Kennedy at congressional hearings held during 1979. Although the 
specifics of the proposals varied, all of them sought to prevent certain 
acquisitions by large firms, without the government needing to show a 
probability of specific anti-competitive practices. As such, they may 
be viewed as attempts to shift the focus of concern regarding conglom­
erate mergers from the traditional antitrust emphasis on competition 
in individual markets to a broader view encompassing those mergers' 
effects on corporate "bigness" in general. If so, the change in per­
spective might be the result either of accepting the view that conglom­
erate mergers are unlikely to adversely affect competition in individual 
markets, or accepting the fact that the courts have increasingly taken 
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such a stand. 
Another view of public policy relating to conglomerate mergers 
is that taken by Benston (1980), Bork (1970), and others. Their recom­
mendations emphatically oppose any new anti-merger legislation, and, 
in most cases, oppose prosecution of conglomerate mergers under the 
existing Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The bases for this position 
include the alleged efficiencies that result from conglomerate mergers, 
the lack of clear-cut evidence of harmful effects of such mergers, and 
the administrative costs (public and private) of enforcing any of the 
proposed laws. For these and other reasons, Benston concludes that the 
proposed legislation "would harm American entrepreneurs, shareholders, 
managers, workers, communities, and consumers, as well as our political 
democracy" (Benston 1980, p. 66). 
Intermediate positions between the two extremes can also be 
found. (See Steiner (1975, Chapter 12).) However, until more agreement 
can be reached regarding the effects of conglomerate mergers, it is 
unlikely that "compromise" solutions will find any greater acceptance 
than their more extreme counterparts. The remainder of this study is 
a modest attempt to contribute to an understanding of the economic 
effects of conglomerate mergers. 
£. Overview of the Remainder of this Dissertation 
In Chapter II, the theoretical relationship between conglomerate 
mergers, changes in the market shares of acquired firms, and competition 
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in the acquired firm's market are discussed. Evidence from previous 
studies that investigated these relationships is discussed in Chapter 
III. Chapter IV presents a model for analyzing the effects of conglom­
erate mergers on industry concentration, and a discussion of the data 
used to test the model. Evidence from estimation of the model, as well 
as related evidence, is presented and interpreted in Chapter V. A 
summary of this study and a brief discussion of some implications of 
its results are presented in Chapter VI. 
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II. MABKET CONCENTRATION AND CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 
This chapter explains the concept of market concentration, and 
examines some of the ways in which it might be related to conglomerate 
mergers. In Section A, the theoretical importance and the measurement 
of market concentration are discussed. The following two sections 
develop the possible relationship between a conglomerate merger and 
changes in market concentration. Such a relationship is itself the 
result of two more fundamental relationships: that between a conglom­
erate merger and a change in the market share of the acquired firm, and 
that between a market share change and a change in market concentration. 
Therefore, these two relationships are discussed, in turn, in Sections 
B and C. Section D considers the potential effects of more than one 
conglomerate merger occurring in an industry, and a brief summary of 
the chapter appears as Section E. 
A. Market Concentration 
1. Market concentration and competition 
The terms "market" and "industry" are not, in general, synonymous, 
industries being defined by goods or services produced and markets by 
the groups of buyers and sellers of those goods and services. Thus, 
a given Industry may consist of one or more markets. For example, 
restaurants in New York and Houston may be thought of as being in the 
same industry, but in different markets. Nevertheless, the two terms 
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will be used interchangeably in this study for two reasons. First, the 
concentration ratios to be used in the study are based on the assumption 
of national markets. Second, the difference between industries and 
markets is not as often distinct in the manufacturing sector (the focus 
of this study) as it is in other sectors of the economy, although some 
local and regional markets do exist in the manufacturing sector. 
Market concentration generally refers to the number of firms 
and the distribution of their market shares in a given market. At one 
extreme is the "perfectly competitive" market, in which there is a 
large number of firms and the market share of each firm is so small 
as to prevent the firm from appreciably affecting the industry price. 
At the other extreme, in a monopoly market one firm has a 100% market 
share for a good or service with no close substitutes. In between 
these two extremes lie the vast majority of real-world economic markets, 
some closer to one extreme and some closer to the other. 
Conventional wisdom in economics holds that the fewer firms 
there are accounting for a large percentage of sales in a market, 
ceteris paribus, the less price competition will occur in that market. 
Weiss (1974, pp. 188-93), for example, has detailed at least eight vari­
ants of oligopoly theory that relate levels of market concentration to 
market power with respect to prices. The crux of the matter in all of 
these theories is the interdependence of firms' profit-maximizing 
decisions in oligopolistic industries. Then, the fewer rivals a firm 
has, the less difficult it is to ascertain its rivals' intentions, 
whether by experience, tacit understandings, or overt collusion. If 
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this leads to co-operation among firms, the industry price will be 
kept at a higher level than that which would result from a more indepen­
dent pursuit of self-interest on the part of each firm. 
In recent years, some dissension from this perspective has emerged 
among a minority of economists. In particular, Demsetz (1974) has 
argued that there is "no serious theoretical basis" (p. 166) for ex­
pecting a relationship between market concentration and market power 
with respect to price. His view seems to be that potential and actual 
entry into an industry constrains the pricing decisions of existing 
firms, and forces prices to approximately competitive levels. In the 
absence of government-erected barriers to entry. 
Two of the means that have been employed to test these opposing 
theories are studies of the relationship between concentration and 
price, and studies of the relationship between concentration and industry 
profits. The number of studies of the former type is relatively small, 
due to the inappropriateness of comparing prices of diverse industries' 
products. In industries with several distinct regional or local markets, 
however, the concentration-price relationship can be meaningfully ana­
lyzed. Scherer (1980, pp. 287-88) reports the results of such studies 
of the banking, gasoline, and food retailing Industries, all of which 
support the existence of a positive relation between market concentra­
tion and market prices, as predicted by conventional economic theory. 
It is not necessarily the case that higher prices will result in 
supra-normal profits in an industry, since low market demand or excess 
industry capacity may cause a concomitant high average cost. Also, 
27 
high industry profits in concentrated industries may reflect low average 
costs resulting from economies of scale or superior management, rather 
than reflect a high price due to monopoly power. These ambiguities 
notwithstanding, there has been extensive research into a concentration-
profits relationship as a means of indirectly testing the concentration-
market power theories. (See Weiss (1974) for a summary of such studies.) 
In spite of serious data difficulties, the overwhelming majority of 
these studies provide moderate-to-weak support for the existence of a 
positive relationship between concentration and industry profits. 
Together with evidence from the concentration-price investigations, 
they buttress the view that market concentration is an important factor 
in determining the amount of price competition in individual markets. 
2. The measurement of market concentration 
As discussed in the preceding section, general, though.hardly 
unanimous, agreement exists among economists that market concentration 
is a factor that affects competition. Less agreement exists with respect 
to the most appropriate means of measuring market concentration. The 
most often used measures for manufacturing industries are the four-firm 
and eight-firm concentration ratios (CR-4 and CR-8, respectively) com­
piled by the Bureau of the Census and published by the U.S. Department 
of Commerce (1981a) using the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
system. This system arranges manufacturing firm data into categories 
with a two-, three-, four-, or five-digit number, where more digits 
represent more disaggregation. For example, a firm producing roofing 
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asphalt would be classified into major industry group 29 ("petroleum 
and coal products"), industry group 295 ("roofing and paving materials"), 
industry 2952 ("asphalt felts and coatings"), and product class 29522 
("roofing asphalts and pitches"). The CR-4 and CR-8 figures are pub­
lished at the four-digit (and five-digit) level (s), and show the per­
centage of sales accounted for by the four and eight largest firms in • 
each industry (and product class). (The 20-firm and 50-firm concen­
tration ratios are also compiled and published in the same report.) 
The primary attribute of these measures of concentration, as compared 
with the measures briefly discussed below, is their fairly comprehensive 
availability, in a readily usable form, to all researchers. For the 
manufacturing sector, 450 four-digit industries are identified, and 
data for many of these cover, at regular intervals, the entire post-
World War II period. 
To be sure, many problems are associated with the use of these 
concentration ratios to measure market concentration. For one, the 
markets represented by the ratios are defined as being national in 
scope. For goods that are perishable or relatively expensive to trans­
port, regional or local market definitions would be more economically 
meaningful. Second, some markets are defined so as to include products 
that are not reasonably close substitutes for each other, from the 
point of view of customers. (Often, such market definitions are based 
on the degree of substitutability in production, or, cross-elasticity 
of supply.) These two factors cause the concentration ratios so 
affected to understate the true degree of seller concentration with 
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respect to market sales. 
On the other hand, at least two factors exist that cause some 
concentration ratios to overstate the true degree of seller concentra­
tion. The first Is the failure, in some Industry definitions, to 
include products that serve as close substitutes for the products in 
the industry. The second is the exclusion of Imports from all industry 
calculations. In those markets where imports are a substantial portion 
of domestic consumption (e.g., automobiles, electronic equipment, etc.), 
and in an environment of increasing international trade, this latter 
problem may be the most serious of all. 
Further problems with the ratios include their failure to measure 
the dispersion of sales among the industry leaders, and the failure to 
adequately account for varying degrees of "fringe firm" (non-leading 
firm) competition. In spite of these and other drawbacks of the ratios, 
as Mueller and Hamm (1974, pp. 511) note, "Most industrial organization 
economists agree that concentration ratios...are the best available... 
useful measures of one dimension of the extent of oligopoly in American 
Industry." 
The resignation with which most economists accept such a flawed 
measure of concentration is best explained by a brief look at some 
alternative measures. One is the Herfindahl-Hlrschman Index, H: 
 ^ 2 H = Z Sj 
1=1 ^ 
where is the market share of the ith firm and N is the number of 
firms in the industry (Scherer 1980, p. 58). The index approaches its 
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maximum value of one as the number of firms decreases, and also as 
the inequality among the market shares of a given number of firms 
increases. 
Another measure, a "comprehensive concentration index" (CCI), is 
proposed by Horvath (1970). Its formula is: 
N 
CCI = X. + Z (X.) (1 + (1 - X )), i = 1; j = 2, 3, ...» N 
 ^ j=2 J J 
where N is the number of firms in the industry and X is the fraction of 
sales for each individual firm, X^  being the largest, and the remaining 
shares being ranked in descending order of size. CCI reflects the largest 
firm's market share and the size of each of the remaining firms relative 
to the dominant firm and to each other. 
Both of these measures share with the concentration ratios the 
problem of the correct definition of a market or industry. The H and 
CCI measures do, though, take into account the potential for fringe 
firm competition and the dispersion of sales among leading firms, and 
so represent a conceptual advance beyond the concentration ratios. 
Unfortunately, however, the precise market share data necessary for the 
calculation of H and CCI is unavailable to private researchers for most 
industries. Until such data are made available, the many disadvantages 
of using concentration ratios will continue to be outweighed by this 
single advantage: comprehensive concentration ratio data are easily 
obtained. 
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B. Conglomerate Mergers and Changes in the 
Market Share of an Acquired Firm 
The market share of a firm acquired in a conglomerate merger may 
be affected in two ways: through an increase in the firm's market power 
vis-à-vis its competitors, or through a change in the firm's efficiency 
in producing or marketing its products. The concern about the conglom­
erate mergers of the 1960s and 1970s, and the proposed public policies 
resulting from that concern, stemmed largely from a fear of increased 
market power for the acquired firm. As discussed briefly in the intro­
ductory chapter, expected manifestations of this increased market power 
include reciprocal buying practices, cross-subsidization strategies, and 
mutual forbearance between large conglomerates. These possibilities 
will now be examined more closely, followed by a discussion of the 
alleged efficiency effects of conglomerate mergers. 
Reciprocal dealing, or reciprocity, refers to the situation where 
two companies, firms A and B, purchase each other's products. Such a 
practice is innocuous in its economic effects as long as both companies 
feel free to purchase elsewhere and make purchasing decisions solely on 
the basis of quality and price. It may even be beneficial, to the 
extent that transactions costs are reduced. However, price competition 
and economic efficiency can be reduced if, for example, firm A agrees 
to purchase from firm B only if B agrees to purchase from A at a price 
above that at which B could purchase equal-quality products from A's 
competitors. This situation could occur if A is a large and valued 
buyer of B's products; in other words, reciprocity can result from A's 
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monopsony power. 
In addition to causing allocative inefficiency by replacing price 
as the allocative device, reciprocity may also constitute an entry 
barrier, as potential entrants to an industry may be discouraged by 
reciprocal buying arrangements of existing firms. This would be espe­
cially possible in the case of a small specialized potential entrant, 
with no buying power leverage of its own. 
Although possibilities for reciprocity exist in the absence of 
any mergers, it has been argued (Steiner 1975, p. 226) that a conglom­
erate merger increases the possibility of such practices; by increasing 
the diversification of the acquiring firm, such a merger increases the 
number of its opportunities for establishing reciprocal relationships. 
An example would be the acquisition by ITT of the Canteen food service 
company. In order to maintain ITT's custom, its many suppliers might 
be induced to use Canteen's services even at a premium price. It is 
such a situation that concerns some opponents of conglomerate mergers. 
Backman (1970, p. 99) has argued, as have others, that anti­
competitive reciprocity is unlikely to occur, because it is costly and 
inefficient for the firms practicing it, and because it conflicts with 
the "profit center" concept of managing large diversified companies. 
(A "profit center" is an operating unit of a company with its own decen­
tralized purchasing and sales departments. At ITT, for example, the 
manager of a profit center is rewarded or penalized according to the 
profit performance of the profit center for which that manager is respon­
sible (Geneen 1970). The argument is that a profit center manager 
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would refuse to make purchasing decisions on the basis of benefits that 
might accrue to any other profit center.) Thus, Backman (1970, p. 95) 
claims, "The theory of 'reciprocity effect* is exaggerated beyond all 
relationship to its possible economic importance." Still, evidence from 
court cases^  and interviews with company executives (Greer 1980, p. 427) 
indicate the anti-competitive effects of the practice are not entirely 
hypothetical. 
Another practice that, it is alleged, can increase the market 
share of a firm acquired in a conglomerate merger is cross-subsidization, 
or, a "deep pocket" strategy. This would occur when a firm lowers the 
price in one of its markets with the intent of thereby gaining a suffi­
cient share of the market to subsequently increase its price above the 
level that would otherwise have existed. To do this, a firm needs a 
source of revenue to subsidize sales in the target market. A diversi­
fied firm would have the opportunity to draw funds from its profitable 
product lines or geographic markets in order to pursue such a "deep 
pocket" strategy for increasing the market share of a firm it acquires; 
hence, the concern over the possibility of this situation arising due 
to conglomerate mergers. 
One form of cross-subsidization is predatory pricing, which can 
be defined as a firm's reduction of its price below the average cost of 
one or a few specific competitors (and perhaps below the average cost 
For example. In re: Waugh Mfg. Co., 15 FTC 232 (1931); FTC v. 
Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); and, U.S. v. General 
Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (1966). 
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of the predator firm as well), the intent being to drive these firms 
out of business. In order for such a strategy to be profitable, it is 
necessary that the firms exit quickly in response to the price cuts, 
that subsequent re-entry is difficult and slow, and that the predator's 
time discount rate is low (Scherer 1980, p. 338). Economists of widely 
varying persuasions are skeptical regarding the occurrence of this 
extreme form of cross-subsidization, due to the restrictive conditions 
under which it is profitable. Also, the practice might be inhibited 
by the use of profit centers in managing a conglomerate. 
There are milder forms of cross-subsidization that, while falling 
short of classic predatory pricing, can be advantageous to a firm 
practicing them. Greer (1980, p. 432) refers to them as "power invest­
ments," and includes in this category spending for advertising and 
other forms of product differentiation. In the same vein, Scherer (1980, 
p. 338) describes actions by an industry leader to enforce industry 
pricing "discipline." These actions can result in increased market 
power, and firms wanting to attempt them would likely turn to internally 
generated funds. Again, the opportunity to do this is greater for a 
diversified firm than for a specialized firm, ceteris paribus, and so 
a conglomerate acquisition raises concerns in some quarters in this 
regard. 
Evidence of the practical significance of cross-subsidization is 
hard to come by. Instances of classic predatory pricing might include 
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1 2 the original Standard Oil Company and Reynolds Metals Company cases, 
although a revisionist history of the former case is accepted by some, 
such as McGee (1958). The advertising campaign for Miller Beer subsi­
dized by the tobacco revenues of the parent company, Phillip Morris, 
3 is one example of the "power investment" strategy discussed above. 
The same possibility concerned the U.S. Supreme Court in its decision 
to uphold the FTC in disallowing the acquisition of Clorox Chemical 
4 Company by Procter and Gamble Company. More comprehensive analysis 
is largely precluded by the unavailability of profit and expenditure 
data for each of a diversified firm's products. Lack of such data 
prevents one from having a reasonable estimate of the extent to which 
cross-subsidization in any of its forms exists. 
Another concern raised in regard to conglomerate mergers is the 
possibility that an attitude of mutual forbearance may develop between 
large diversified firms that face each other as rivals in numerous 
markets (Edwards 1955; 1970). While reciprocity and cross-subsidization 
can be thought of as possible means for increasing the market share of 
an acquired firm, mutual forbearance would be more likely to result in 
the stabilization of the market shares of the acquired firm and others 
in the acquired firm's industry. A firm with the opportunity to 
S^tandard Oil Company of New Jersey v, U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
R^eynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F. 2nd 223 (1962). 
3 Business Week, November 8, 1976, pp. 58-67, 
4 
FTC V. Procter and Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). 
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aggressively compete for sales in one market in which it operates may 
decline that opportunity, fearing that such action might provoke its 
rivals in Chat market to retaliate in another market common to each. A 
"live and let live" attitude regarding competition for increased market 
shares may develop between the firms, as each perceives the potential 
losses from such retaliation to exceed any potential gains from an 
aggressive competitive act. 
Large diversified firms that are rivals in two or more markets 
may find themselves in one of two situations when facing each other 
in one of chose markets (Edwards 1970, pp. 436-38). Either they will 
differ considerably with respect to the importance each places on its 
sales and profits from that market, or they will be similar in that 
regard. In the former instance, "the most sensible policy for each 
firm is to recognize the other's priority of interest for products 
important to the other but not to it, in the expectation that similar 
recognition will be given reciprocally" (Edwards 1970, p. 437). In 
other words, "spheres of influence" may develop between conglomerates 
with substantially the same areas, but differing emphases, of diversi­
fication. In the instance of conglomerates that have similar areas 
and emphases of diversification, "the relation between competiCors is 
likely Co have aspecCs of mucual forbearance, akin boch in kind and 
mocivacion Co that which is attributed by many economists to oligopoly" 
(Edwards 1970, p. 437). In either case, the assertion is that compe­
tition between large diversified firms will be weakened, and the 
implication is a rigidity of market structures. 
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Limited evidence of the existence of mutual forbearance between 
diversified firms can be found, most of it anecdotal. (For examples, 
see Greer (1980, p. 422).) As well, at least two empirical studies of 
the phenomenon have been completed, one supporting its existence in the 
banking industry (Heggestad and Rhoades 1978), and one failing to support 
its existence in the Japanese economy (Caves and Uekusa 1976, pp. 72-86). 
As in the cases of reciprocity and cross-subsidization, a direct test 
of this hypothetical result of diversification through merger is rendered 
extremely difficult by the lack of availability of the necessary data. 
The preceding discussion dealt with strategies that might be 
pursued by a conglomerate firm to increase the market share of an ac­
quired firm (or, in the case of mutual forbearance, stabilize an ac­
quired firm's market share). Although there is no consensus that such 
activities occur to a significant degree, to the extent that they do 
occur they would clearly interfere with the allocative efficiency of 
market results. Another set of hypotheses about the effects of conglom­
erate mergers concerns the production efficiency of the conglomerate 
firms and their acquisitions. 
In a sense, the issue of conglomerate efficiency in production 
is tangential to the question of how a conglomerate merger affects the 
market power of the acquired firm. In overly simple terms, the two 
issues can be thought of as the cost-reducing (or cost-increasing) and 
the price-increasing (or, market share-increasing) effects of conglom­
erate mergers, respectively. The latter effects, having to do with the 
allocative efficiency of markets, are the focus of this study. Any such 
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effects, whether beneficial or harmful to competition, could arise 
regardless of the effects on an individual firm's production effi­
ciency. However, a change in a firm's level of efficiency can affect 
that firm's ability to engage in price competition, if not necessarily 
its willingness to do so. Also, since the present study has a fairly 
narrow perspective, any policy considerations stemming from it results 
must be considered in light of some familiarity with evidence pertaining 
to other perspectives, such as conglomerate efficiency. 
Most of the controversy surrounding the production efficiency 
effects of conglomerate mergers concerns the existence of one or more 
means by which such a merger can increase the efficiency of the acquired 
and/or the acquiring firm. Sources of possible real economies resulting 
from conglomerate mergers include reduced risk of firm failure due to a 
sales downturn in any single product line, the replacement of poor 
managers, and joint production of products to take advantage of scale 
economies at various levels of production. (See Benston (1980, pp. 31-
35) as an example of the many discussions of the possible "synergistic" 
effects of conglomerate mergers.) If evidence of significant resource 
savings from such sources could be found, it would constitute a strong 
argument in favor of conglomerate mergers. 
Mueller (1977) has conducted an extensive review of studies that 
search for increases in firm efficiency due to conglomerate mergers. 
He found "a surprisingly consistent picture" showing that conglomerate 
mergers "have not resulted in increased efficiency" (Mueller 1977, 
p. 344); Scherer (1980, p. 141) has reached a similar conclusion. 
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Benston (1980, p. 2 and pp. 44-45), reviewing many of the same studies 
as Mueller (1977) and Scherer (1980), concludes that conglomerate mergers 
have led to increased efficiency, but his view is largely based on 
findings of gains to shareholders of acquired firms. These findings 
are also reported by Mueller (1977) and Scherer (1980), but are explained 
as mainly resulting from the payment by acquiring firms of a premium over 
the market value of the acquired firms. (In this context, Mueller (1977, 
p. 332) concedes that the mergers "appear to have generated [some] effi­
ciency gains," contradicting somewhat his final conclusion cited above.) 
At the least, it seems safe to conclude that there is a lack of evidence 
of dramatic economies arising from conglomerate mergers. Thus, it does 
not seem likely that increased efficiency of acquired firms is a factor 
that will be found in this study to have affected the market shares of 
those firms. 
The evidence just discussed obviously also relates to the possi­
bility that conglomerate mergers might reduce the efficiency of the 
acquired or the acquiring firms. Although the theory underlying such 
a hypothesis has not been carefully developed in the literature, it 
is implied by theories of managerial diseconomies (Dean 1970). Specif­
ically, it could be argued that in the process of diversifying, a 
conglomerate may so increase its corporate co-ordination problems that 
an overall reduction in firm efficiency results. This might happen 
because of the relatively rapid diversification entailed by conglom­
erate acquisition, as opposed to the (presumably) more lengthy process 
of internal development of a new product line. Also, more careful 
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consideration of the advisability of adding a new product line may occur 
in the case of internal development. As Dean (1970) argues, conglom­
erate acquisitions often occur as the result of opportunity (i.e., the 
acquisition is "doable"), rather than because of significant complemen­
tarities between the acquired and acquiring firms. If, as he claims, 
managerial ability is not easily transferable across industries, the 
result might be poorer performance of the acquired firm, and, thus, a 
loss of its market share. 
Although business publications abound in examples of conglomerates 
that were unable to "digest" one or another of their acquisitions, the 
evidence cited earlier indicates that this problem is not a general 
one. Therefore, any trend toward decreases in the market shares of ac­
quired firms observed in this study would not likely be attributable to 
conglomerate-related managerial inefficiencies. 
C. Changes in Market Shares and Changes in Market Concentration 
As explained previously, this study assumes the perspective of 
conventional economic theory that competition in a market is affected 
by the distribution of the market shares of firms in that market. From 
this perspective, one may infer the effects of conglomerate mergers on 
competition by observing the effects of those mergers on the market 
shares of acquired firms. Unfortunately, the requisite market share 
data for such an inference are generally unavailable. Therefore, it is 
also necessary in such an inquiry to infer changes in market shares from 
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changes in market concentration ratios, for which data are available. 
It is hoped that this doubly indirect approach will yield some insight 
regarding the effects, if any, of conglomerate mergers on competition. 
This section details the possible ways in which changes in market shares 
of acquired firms can be related to changes in market concentration. 
Throughout the following discussion it is assumed that the only source 
of change in market shares is a change in the market share of an acquired 
firm. 
If the acquired firm were one of the leading firms (the four or 
eight largest) in its market, any increase in its market share that is 
not at the expense of the other leading firms' shares will cause concen­
tration in that market to increase. Any loss of its market share that 
is not captured by the other leading firms will cause concentration to 
decrease. The concentration ratio will remain unchanged if any increase 
or decrease in the acquired firm's market share is entirely taken from, 
or captured by, the other leading firms. Thus, a change in the aarkst 
share of an acquired leading firm could cause concentration in its market 
to increase, decrease, or remain unchanged. 
The effect of the acquisition of a non-leading firm is a bit more 
complicated. If such a firm loses some of its market share after the 
acquisition, the concentration ratio would increase if at least some 
of that share were acquired by a leading firm. If all of the lost 
market share were acquired by non-leading firms, the concentration ratio 
would likely remain unchanged, ceteris paribus, but it would increase if 
another non-leading firm acquired enough of the lost market share to 
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push that firm into a leading firm position. In no case could the lost 
market share of an acquired non-leading firm result in a decrease in 
market concentration. So, assuming that in at least some instances 
the lost market share is acquired by leading firms, the average effect 
in this case would be an increase in market concentration. 
If an acquired non-leading firm increases its market share post-
acquisition, the concentration ratio can, in theory, either increase, 
decrease, or remain unchanged. The three possibilities are presented 
algebraically below for the case of CR-4. The following notation is 
used: 
is the market share of the ith firm in the industry, when the 
firms are ranked i = 1, 2, ..., n from largest to smallest, ac­
cording to their market shares. 
is the market share of the acquired firm, A. 
Superscript 1 denotes the situation at the time of the acquisition 
of firm A (period 1). 
Superscript 2 denotes the post-acquisition situation (period 2). 
2 1 In the cases considered here, it is assumed that S^  > S^ , i.e., the 
market share of the acquired non-leading firm increases post-acquisition. 
By definition, the four-firm concentration ratios in the industry in 
4 2 4 2 
periods 1 and 2 are Z S. and E S , respectively. 
i=l  ^ i=l  ^
If firm A, due to a post-acquisition increase in its market share, 
becomes a leading firm by period 2, then by definition firm A has dis­
placed one of the firms that was a leading firm in period 1. In this 
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situation, denotes the period 1 market share of the leading firm that 
2 1 firm A displaces post-acquisition (by period 2). Thus, is the 
difference between the market share of firm A in period 2 and the market 
share in period 1 of the firm that is displaced (between periods 1 and 2) 
by firm A. Further, the combined lost market share (between periods 1 
and 2) of the leading firms other than the one displaced by firm A can 
^ 1 2  be denoted as I (S. - S ). 
i=l  ^  ^
4 , 4 2  
Case 1: E s. = Z S., or, no change in CR-4. 
i=l  ^ i=l  ^
A post-acquisition increase in the market share of an acquired 
non-leading firm will not affect CR-4 if either of the following 
conditions holds: 
a) if all of the post-acquistion increase in firm A's market 
2 1 
share comes from other non-leading firms, and for 
all leading firms. (The second part of this condition means 
that firm A does not become a leading firm by period 2); or, 
2  1 ^ 1 2  b) if S - S = E (S - S.). Under this condition, firm 
A D 1 1 
A becomes a leading firm by period 2, but the difference 
between firm A's market share in period 2 and the displaced 
firm's market share in period 1 is equal to the combined 
lost market share of the other three leading firms. 
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Case 2; Z S. > S S., or, a decrease in CR-4. 
i=l  ^ i=l  ^
CR-4 will decrease if at least some of the increase in firm 
A's market share is obtained from a decrease in the combined market 
shares of the leading firms, and if either of the following 
conditions also holds: 
a) if firm A does not become a leading firm by period 2; or, 
b) if s2 _ $1 < (sj - s:). 
4 1 4 2 
Case 3; Z S. < Z S., or, an increase in CR-4. 
i=l  ^ i=l  ^
CR-4 will increase only if both of the following conditions 
hold: 
a) if firm A becomes a leading firm by period 2; and 
3 
b) if - sj; > z (s^ - gZ). 
A w 1 1 
In other words, in order for the acquisition of a non-leading firm 
to result in an increase in concentration because of an increase in 
the acquired firm's market share, two conditions must hold. First, the 
acquired firm must become one of the leading firms. Second, its ulti­
mate market share must exceed the share of a displaced original leading 
firm by an amount greater than the sum of the differences between the 
pre- and post-merger shares of the other leading firms (which need not 
be the same firms in both periods). Evidence presented by Goldberg 
(1972) and the FTC (1972) suggests that the first of these conditions 
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is not likely to be often met. Consideration of the second condition 
makes the likelihood of Case 3 occurring rather small. Hence, the 
average effect of an increase in the market share of an acquired non-
leading firm is expected to be a decrease in concentration. 
In light of the preceding discussion, then, concentration may be 
expected to decrease in three different instances: 
1) the market share of an acquired non-leading firm increases due 
to its increased efficiency (but the firm does not become a 
leading firm) ; 
2) the market share of an acquired non-leading firm increases due 
to the practice of reciprocity, cross-subsidization, or similar 
"anti-competitive" practices (but the firm does not become a 
leading firm); or, 
3) the market share of an acquired leading firm decreases due to 
its reduced efficiency. 
Recall that the perspective of this study, and, indeed, of most 
analyses of conglomerate merger effects, is that a decrease in concentra­
tion is desirable from the standpoint of increasing competition. Note, 
however, that only in the first of the above cases does this desirable 
effect stem from an unambiguously desirable cause. In the second case, 
concentration decreases as a result of the same actions that would be 
condemned for causing an increase in concentration if the acquired firm 
were an industry leader. In the third case, reduced firm efficiency, 
seldom applauded by economists, is seen to reduce concentration and 
perhaps ultimately lead to increased allocative efficiency. 
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If concentration increases as a result of a conglomerate merger, 
the reason would be one of the following: 
1) an increase in the market share of an acquired leading firm 
due to its increased efficiency; 
2) an increase in the market share of an acquired leading firm 
due to its "anti-competitive" practices; or, 
3) a decrease in the market share of an acquired non-leading firm 
due to its decreased efficiency. 
(A fourth possibility is the unlikely Case 3 explained on Page 44 
above, where the acquired non-leading firm becomes a leading firm 
after increasing its market share due to its increased efficiency 
3 
or its "anti-competitive" practices, and > Z (S^  - S^ ).) 
A  ^ 1=1  ^ 1 
While an increase in market concentration may be generally unde­
sirable, the first case above indicates (as does the unlikely fourth 
possibility) that it may result from a desirable increase in firm 
efficiency. 
The paradoxes just described, of desirable effects caused by, or 
accompanied by, undesirable ones, should be borne in mind during any 
interpretation of empirical results regarding the effects of conglom­
erate mergers on changes in industry concentration. They also render 
ambiguous the use of "pro-competitive" and "anti-competitive" to 
describe those effects, a practice common in the literature on conglom­
erate mergers. 
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D. Industries Experiencing Multiple Conglomerate Mergers 
A final theoretical consideration concerns the occurrence of more 
than one conglomerate merger into a particular industry. It is not 
immediately clear whether this situation would tend to increase or 
reduce the likelihood of a change in the market shares of acquired 
firms. On the one hand, there are at least two reasons that multiple 
conglomerate mergers into an industry might reduce the likelihood of 
a change in concentration. First, the more firms that gain an "advan­
tage" in a market from acquisition by a firm outside that market, the 
smaller is each firm's relative advantage; in the extreme, an advantage 
for each is an advantage for none. The same reasoning holds for any 
disadvantages due to conglomerate acquisition. Second, the possibil­
ities for mutual forbearance increase, ceteris paribus, the more con­
glomerate firms there are that meet in an industry. Since an implica­
tion of mutual forbearance is the increased stability of market shares, 
this supports a hypothesis that more conglomerate mergers in an industry 
will be associated with less change in concentration. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that if each conglomerate 
merger has a given probability of affecting concentration, an increase 
in the number of such mergers into an industry increases the probability 
of some change in concentration in that industry. This line of rea­
soning, of course, requires the probability that a given merger, M^ , 
will affect concentration to be sufficiently independent of the exis­
tence of other conglomerate mergers; in other words, if other mergers 
48 
into an industiry mitigate the effects of the sum of the effects of 
those mergers on concentration must be assumed to outweigh any miti­
gating influence on the effects of that they might exert. 
Because of the conflicting possibilities just discussed, the 
effects on changes in industry concentration in the event of multiple 
conglomerate mergers into an industry are even more difficult to predict 
than the effect of a single conglomerate merger. 
E. Summary 
The discussion in this chapter has examined the theoretical rela­
tionship between conglomerate mergers and changes in market concentra­
tion. Competing theories have led to different predictions in at least 
two areas with which this dissertation is concerned: the direction, if 
any, in which a conglomerate merger might be expected to change an ac­
quired firm's market share and concentration in that firm's industry; 
and, whether any competitive effects of conglomerate mergers become 
more likely or less likely in the event of multiple mergers in an 
industry. These questions will be addressed in the empirical work of 
this study, in Chapters IV and V. First, though, it will be useful to 
discuss the evidence from relevant studies by other researchers. Such 
a discussion is the focus of the following chapter. 
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III. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Most studies of conglomerate mergers have been concerned with 
the production efficiency effects for firms that have engaged in con­
glomerate mergers, rather than with the effects on competition in indus­
tries that have experienced such mergers. The studies attempt to 
discern whether large diversified firms are able to reduce costs rela­
tive to more specialized firms due to risk-spreading, lower borrowing 
costs, faster redeployment of capital, or other advantages. If such 
an effect could be demonstrated, then it might wholly or partially 
offset any anti-competitive effects of mergers that result in the ability 
to raise prices above costs. 
Results from these studies were discussed briefly in Chapter II, 
where it was concluded that there is little evidence of dramatic effi­
ciency (or inefficiency) effects on firms as a result of their having 
been involved in conglomerate mergers. In any event, efficiency gains 
or their absence have no necessary relationship to the competitive 
effects of conglomerate mergers due to reciprocal buying, deep-pocket 
strategies, or mutual forbearance, which are the primary focus of this 
study. Therefore, there will be no further discussion relating to 
studies of the efficiency effects of conglomerate mergers. 
As explained in the preceding chapter, direct systematic testing 
for a relationship between conglomerate mergers and the practices of 
reciprocity, cross-subsidization, and mutual forbearance is exceedingly 
difficult. This is because the necessary information regarding such 
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trade and pricing practices is closely held by private firms. Even if 
these practices occur, the dim view that the courts take of them ensures 
that such information as is made public will be unlikely to reveal the 
occurrence of the practices. Because of these difficulties, studies 
of the effects of conglomerate mergers on competition have generally 
been forced to rely on proxies for competition such as market concen­
tration ratios or, in one instance, changes in the market shares of 
acquired firms. The four major studies of this type will be discussed 
below. 
Caves (1981) conducted a study that, while not directly addressing 
the issue of conglomerate mergers, does have relevance to this disser­
tation. The study employed the 1972 Enterprise Statistics classifi­
cation of manufacturing industries, published by the Bureau of the 
Census, in which industries are defined somewhat more broadly than the 
three-digit level of the SIC categories. The change in concentration 
in 67 of these industries between 1963 and 1972 was analyzed as a 
function of the change in diversification into (and out of) the indus­
tries, while controlling for the change in industry shipments, the 
consumer-goods status, the degree of product differentiation, and the 
capital intensity of the industries. The measures of inbound and out­
bound diversification were proportional changes in the coverage ratio 
and the specialization ratio, respectively, as reported in the Commerce 
Department's Census of Manufactures. The former is the proportion of 
shipments by all plants classified to an industry accounted for by 
firms classified to the industry; the latter is the proportion of 
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shipments of firms classified to an industry accounted for by plants 
classified to the industry. These measures do not distinguish between 
different types of diversification (conglomerate or vertical integra­
tion) or different means of diversification (internal or acquisition). 
The measure of inbound diversification is relevant to this dissertation 
because it does include conglomerate mergers, and because many of the 
alleged competitive effects of conglomerate mergers are associated with 
other types and means of diversification. (For a discussion of the 
similarities between vertical and conglomerate mergers, see Goldberg 
(1972, pp. 49-51).) 
For the entire sample. Caves found the coefficient on the inbound 
diversification variable to be positive but not significantly related 
(at the 10% level) to changes in CR-4, CR-8, or CR-20. Dividing the 
sample into groups of industries with concentration ratios greater than 
the median level and less than the median level altered these results 
somewhat. In the high-concentration group, inbound diversification 
still had a coefficient insignificantly different from zero. However, 
the coefficient on inbound diversification was positive and significant 
(at the 5% level) for the low-concentration group of industries. In 
Caves' opinion, this positive correlation does not support a "market 
power" hypothesis, since "It can hardly pay to dip into the deep pocket 
in order to lift four-firm concentration from 18% to 25%" (Caves 1981, 
p. 292). Rather, it suggests to him that "in some industries diversi­
fying entrants enjoyed some rent-yielding advantage against small-share 
specialized firms that raise their market shares and hence seller 
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concentration" (Caves 1981, p. 292). Given the coarseness of the diver­
sification measure, accepting Caves' conclusions does not necessarily 
support the view that conglomerate mergers result in increased firm 
efficiency. In fact, the results seem more likely to reflect efficien­
cies gained through vertical integration or internal diversification, 
since these hold the same potential efficiency gains as conglomerate 
mergers without the disadvantages of mergers discussed by Dean (1970) 
and cited in Chapter II above. At least, though, the study does not 
seem to support the theory that conglomerate mergers will result in 
increases in concentration due to the practice of reciprocity, cross-
subsidization, and the like. 
Markham (1973) looked at changes in concentration in 18 three-
digit SIC industries that experienced three or more conglomerate mergers 
during the period 1958-67, and 43 four-digit SIC industries that exper­
ienced 10 or more conglomerate mergers during the period 1961-70. Though 
not explicitly stated, his assumption must have been that multiple con­
glomerate mergers would make more likely any effects of those mergers 
on concentration. In both samples, there were more decreases in concen­
tration than increases. However, the nature of his data and the lack 
of rigor in his method of analysis led to the cautious conclusions that 
"diversifying acquisitions have had no measurable effect on concentra­
tion in the 4-digit industries acquired" (Markham 1973, p. 110), and 
that "such acquisitions may possibly have reduced the level of market 
concentration" (Markham 1973, p. 109) at the three-digit level. At the 
least, it is clear that his study fails to support the hypothesis that 
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conglomerate mergers result in increases in market concentration. 
An additional observation by Markham was that "In three-fourths 
of the industries the change in concentration, whether an increase or 
a decrease, was less than five percentage points" (Markham 1973, p. 109). 
Unfortunately, he does not compare this result with increases or 
decreases in concentration in industries experiencing little or no 
conglomerate merger activity. Such a comparison with a "control group" 
of industries would have made this observation, and those cited above, 
more meaningful. 
A Federal Trade Commission study (FTC 1972) employed a data set 
that contained market share information unavailable to most researchers. 
The study examined the nature and effects of nine large firms that were 
engaged in extensive conglomerate merger activity during the 1960s.^  
These companies accounted for about 8% of the total number of mining 
and manufacturing acquisitions of firms with assets of $10 million or 
more during the period 1960-68 (FTC 1972, p. 21). However, only seven 
of the firms submitted usable data regarding acquired five-digit product 
classes; these were the data used for the market share analysis, which 
covered the years 1963-69. 
It was found that about 54% of the acquired firms' market shares 
in their product classes were less that 1%; only about 9% of the ac­
quired firms' market shares were 10% or greater. Furthermore, the 
T^he firms were: Litton Industries, Ling-Temco-Vought, Gulf and 
Western Industries, ITT, Textron, Rapid-American, White Consolidated 
Industries, FMC Corporation, and Norton Simon (FTC 1972, p. 18). 
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four-digit industries represented by these product classes were most 
apt to be relatively unconcentrated : 60% of them had a CR-4 of 40% or 
less, and only 12% had a CR-4 of 60% or greater. Thus, the tendency 
for these seven firms was to acquire relatively small firms in relatively 
unconcentrated industries. The report states that the pattern of ac­
quisitions "does not provide much ground for alarm or enthusiasm from 
a competitive standpoint. It can be described as largely neutral" (FEC 
1972, p. 82). 
After acquisition, the acquired non-leading firms' market shares 
exhibited slightly more decreases than increases, while decreases and 
increases were equal in number for the acquired market shares of leading 
firms. Thus, the study concludes that for both toe-hold and leading 
firm acquisitions, "there is no systematic tendency for market shares 
either to increase or decrease after acquisition" (FTC 1972, p. 82). 
These facts did not surprise the authors, given their other findings 
that acquired firms experienced few changes, on average, in management, 
advertising expenditures, or profitability after acquisition. The study 
provided no evidence regarding the occurrence of mutual forbearance 
between the conglomerates. 
The results of the FTC study, then, are generally in accord with 
those of Markham (1973) and the Goldberg studies (1972; 1974) (which are 
discussed below). However, the time period analyzed allowed little time 
for any effects to materialize from mergers taking place at the peak of 
the conglomerate merger "wave" of the late 1960s. The limited sample 
and time period should cause agreement with the FTC view that "The data 
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presented...are suggestive rather than definitive" (FTC 1972, p. 86). 
A fourth type of approach was taken by Goldberg (1972; 1974) to 
analyze changes in concentration in manufacturing industries during the 
period 1954-63. In his initial analysis, Goldberg tested whether the 
change in concentration in industries entered by conglomerate acquisi­
tion was significantly different from zero. He found that "The null 
hypothesis that conglomerate mergers are not associated with concentra­
tion change cannot be rejected" (Goldberg 1974, p. 309). The study had 
the appealing aspect of separating conglomerate mergers into leading and 
and non-leading firm categories, as the economic theory suggests should 
be done. However, his use of each merger as one datum results in 
multiple-counting of Industries experiencing more than one merger, and 
renders his use of the Central Limit Theorem suspect. (That theorem 
requires independent observations to construct an asymptotically nor­
mally distributed variable for statistical testing; two observations 
of the same industry are clearly not independent.) Further, Goldberg 
failed to compare a lack of change in concentration in these industries 
to the trend of concentration in industries that did not experience 
conglomerate mergers. This prevents the drawing of sound conclusions 
regarding the effect of conglomerate mergers on concentration. 
The second analysis in each of Goldberg's studies X1972; 1974) was 
more ambitious : he used regression analysis to study changes in industry 
concentration, again focusing only on industries experiencing conglom­
erate mergers. The independent variables used, in various combinations, 
included the assets of the acquired and acquiring companies, the ratio 
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of those assets, the length of time since the merger, the number of 
conglomerate mergers into an Industry, and the average level of concen­
tration (the initial level plus the final level, divided by two). All 
of those variables, with the exception of the last one, seem appropri­
ate; however, regressing - CR^ ) on + CR^ )/2 is curious, to 
say the least. However, it should be noted that this questionable var­
iable was not used in all of Goldberg's regressions. 
In general, the coefficients of the independent variables were 
not significantly different from zero at the 5% level, although the 
coefficient on the "time" variable occasionally was significantly posi­
tive. In one regression focusing on leading firm mergers, the number 
of such mergers had a significantly positive coefficient. 
Goldberg's results, then, seem to strongly reject the hypothesis 
that conglomerate mergers affect concentration, as measured by concen­
tration ratios. However, three caveats to this conclusion must be 
offered. The first is to note again the methodological problems of 
the study, especially the lack of a "control" group of industries not 
experiencing conglomerate mergers. Second, Goldberg neglected to con­
trol for some important factors that have been shown to affect changes 
in industry concentration levels over time: in particular, entry of 
new firms (Caves and Porter 1980) and whether an industry produces 
consumer goods or producer goods (t&ieller and Hamm 1974; Scherer 1979; 
Caves and Porter 1980). The third shortcoming of the study is that it 
examines the period 1954-63, which is prior to the conglomerate merger 
"wave" of the late 1960s. As Scherer (1980, p. 347) has noted. 
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"Interpretation of [Goldberg's] results would be facilitated if there 
were comparable (and ideally better controlled) evidence concerning the 
period after 1963...." 
Mueller (1977), in the most complete review to date of studies 
of the effects of conglomerate mergers, states that "A fair consensus 
exists that conglomerate mergers have not contributed to increases in 
industry level concentration, ...and have not had serious anti-compet-
itive effects" (p. 336). He specifically bases this conclusion on the 
Markham, FTC, and Goldberg studies. As explained above, though, each 
of these studies has serious shortcomings, either in the depth of the 
study (Markham 1973), the scope of the study (FTC 1972), or the statis­
tical approach (Goldberg 1972; 1974). Furthermore, none of the studies 
examines evidence from the 1970s. Thus, the evidence to date seems 
insufficient to support such "a fair consensus." The remainder of this 
study seeks both to overcome shortcomings of the prior studies, and to 
use data from the 1970s that were unavailable to previous investigators, 
in an attempt to shed some light on what effect, if any, conglomerate 
mergers have had on changes in industry concentration in the manufac­
turing sector of the U.S. econon^ . 
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IV. A MODEL AND DATA FOR EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF 
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS ON INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION 
In this chapter, the model used to test theories relating conglom­
erate mergers and industry concentration is presented. Section A is 
a discussion of the variables that economic theory and previous studies 
suggest should be used in such an investigation. The data used in this 
study are discussed in Section B. 
A. The Theoretical Model 
1. Dependent variables 
As explained in Chapter II, this study focuses on industry concen­
tration as one important determinant of the degree of intra-industry 
competition. Also in that chapter was offered a justification for 
the use of four-firm and eight-firm concentration ratios (CR-4 and 
CR-8, respectively) as the measures of industry concentration. In 
accord with that discussion, then, the dependent variable in the model 
is the change in CR-4 or CR-8 from 1967 through 1977 for the various 
industries to be analyzed. 
Previous studies have analyzed both absolute and proportional 
changes in concentration (Caves 1981; Caves and Porter 1980; and, 
Goldberg 1972, 1974). Explicit in Goldberg's studies, and implicit 
in the others, is the argument that economic theory does not suggest 
whether the absolute change or the percentage change is, in general. 
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the appropriate variable to consider. However, economic theory and 
common sense should lead one to reject the treatment of an increase 
in CR-4 from 5% to 6% as comparable to an increase in CR-4 from 60% 
to 72%, although both are 20% increases. It seems clear that analysis 
of proportional changes is inappropriate when initial levels are 
substantially different. Therefore, the dependent variable is, alter­
natively, the absolute change in concentration and a "proportional 
change" that measures the percentage change in the gap between 1967 
concentration and the most extreme concentration ratio possible, 
namely, 100%. The proportional change variable is calculated as: 
PROCHNGCR^  = (CR^  ^1977 " 1967^ ^^ °^° ~ ^ i^, 1967^ ' 
where CR^  is the four- or eight-firm concentration ratio for the ith 
industry. Thus, in the example above, the change from 60% to 72% is 
a greater absolute and proportional change than the increase from 5% 
to 6%. In any case, if two industries have the same absolute change 
in concentration, the one with the higher initial concentration would 
have the greater "proportional" change in the sense defined above. 
This approach is generally consistent with oligopoly theories that 
postulate a "critical level" of concentration. (A critical level of 
concentration is a level below which industries act "competitively," 
and above which non-competitive practices, such as collusive pricing 
agreements, may arise,) A. possible Inconsistency between this approach 
and a "critical level" theory would arise with equal FROCHNGCRs for 
two industries, one industry initially slightly below a critical 
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level and the other initially well above such a level. It could 
reasonably be argued that the former industry had experienced a more 
anti-competitive change in concentration, though PROCHNGCR would not 
capture that effect. Still, it is hoped that the use of 100% concen­
tration as an absolute standard would yield interesting results, in 
the absence of agreement regarding "the" critical level, or even its 
existence. 
2. Independent variables 
The independent variables in the model fall into two categories: 
variables relating to conglomerate mergers, and variables included to 
control for other factors thought to influence changes in industry 
concentration. The control variables are discussed first. 
a. Type of product The nature of an industry's customers 
(producers, consumers, or both) has been found in previous studies to 
be significantly related to changes in that industry's level of concen­
tration. In particular, Mueller and Hamm (1974), Scherer (1979), and 
Caves and Porter (1980) found concentration in consumer-goods industries 
to have increased during periods when concentration in producer-goods 
industries has remained stable or decreased. This finding has been 
explained by reference to theories of product differentiation. It is 
suggested that, at the manufacturing level, large advertising expendi­
tures by leading firms can serve to increase, or at least protect, the 
market shares of those firms. This may be due to the persuasive 
effects of the advertising, the entry barriers resulting from the 
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advertising and other forms of product differentiation, or some combi­
nation of these factors. Furthermore, it is argued that product differ­
entiation, and particularly persuasive advertising, is more likely to 
affect the purchasing patterns of consumers than to affect purchases 
by other producers. The basis for this argument is that businesses 
will often have employees specializing (full-time or part-time) in the 
purchasing process. These specialists are able to develop expertise in 
judging the quality of the goods they purchase and keep records of past 
purchases, reducing their susceptibility to unsubstantiated persuasive 
advertising. Consumers, on the other hand, are less likely to develop 
such expertise, being unable to spread the cost of it over a sufficiently 
large volume of purchases. Hence, the inclusion of a variable to capture 
any such differences between consumer-goods and producer-goods indus­
tries . 
b. Growth in industry demand Economic theory suggests that 
the market shares of firms are likely to be more volatile, and concen­
tration ratios more likely to decline, in industries that are growing, 
as opposed to stagnant or declining industries (Shepherd 1964, pp. 
203-6). This will be true if growth in industry demand outstrips the 
growth in optimal plant or firm size, or exceeds the ability of leading 
firms to meet the growth in demand, or encourages the entry of new firms. 
In other words, the growth of an industry is expected to be negatively 
related to the change in concentration in that industry, and a variable 
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to account for this relationship is included in the model. 
c. Entry of new firms The model also includes a variable to 
represent the net entry of firms into an industry. According to Mueller 
and Hamm (1974, p. 515), this variable should be "viewed more as a 
symptom than a cause because it reflects the more fundamental causes of 
structural change." For instance, as noted above, the entry of firms 
into an industry will likely be related to the growth of the industry. 
Also, the rate of entry is a reflection of the height of barriers to 
entry such as capital requirements. These underlying relationships 
certainly make a theoretical interpretation of this variable's regression 
coefficient somewhat difficult; still, its inclusion seems warranted for 
at least two reasons. First, if the effects of conglomerate mergers are 
to be isolated, it is important to control to some degree for other 
potential influences on concentration, such as entry barriers. This 
variable serves that function, albeit indirectly and imperfectly. 
Second, in spite of the correlation between entry of firms and growth 
of industry demand. Caves and Porter (1980) found both variables to 
"wield independent influences on concentration" (p. 11). 
d. Previous changes in concentration Another control variable 
in the model is one to account for prior trends in the concentration 
level of each industry. If industries have an "equilibrium level of 
concentration" which they approach rapidly whenever in disequilibrium. 
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previous changes in concentration might be inversely related to more 
recent changes. If, on the other hand, such equilibria do not exist, 
or are approached only at a very slow pace, a trend variable might be 
positively related to recent changes in concentration. In either case, 
it is appropriate to adjust for differences between industries with 
regard to their previous changes in concentration. 
e. Number of horizontal mergers The final control variable 
is the extent of horizontal merger activity experienced by each industry. 
The acquisition by a leading firm of another firm in the Industry, 
leading or non-leading, would immediately increase concentration as 
measured by the CR-4 and CR-8, which are calculated on the basis of 
national markets. The merger of two non-leading firms might increase 
concentration or leave it unchanged, depending on the initial size of 
the merging firms. Subsequent to the merger, concentration might also 
be affected by activities of the surviving (post-merger) firm. Since 
this study is not concerned with the specific effects of horizontal 
mergers, it is important simply to control for any effects they might 
have on changes in concentration. 
f. N"mT^ er and nature of conglomerate mergers The key 
independent variables in the model are those that reflect the conglom­
erate merger activity in each industry. Although a conglomerate merger, 
by definition, can have no immediate effect on industry concentration, 
the market share increasing or decreasing effects of such mergers. 
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discussed in Chapter II, may ultimately lead to an increase or decrease 
in concentration. As explained in that chapter, the direction of any 
change in concentration depends in large part on the pre-merger market 
share of the acquired firm. Thus, it is important to determine the 
market position of the acquired firm in order to test theories of the 
effects of conglomerate mergers. Therefore, variables are included in 
the model to reflect the number of leading firm and the number of non-
leading firm acquisitions that occur in an industry during the period 
of time examined. However, as discussed below, data problems often 
make such distinctions unreliable. For this reason, an alternative 
specification of the model is also employed which has a variable reflect­
ing all conglomerate mergers, leading and non-leading. This variable 
can be thought of as testing for the effects of the "average" conglom­
erate merger. 
g. Relative sizes of acquiring and acquired firms Whether the 
acquiring firm helps to increase the market share of the acquired firm 
or causes its share to decline, the effect is potentially related to 
the size of the acquiring firm relative to the acquired firm. In regard 
to the potential for increasing a market share, the larger the acquiring 
firm is relative to the acquired firm, the more possible would be an 
increase in the acquired firm's market share due to reciprocal dealing 
or "deep-pocket" strategies. In regard to a decrease in the acquired 
firm's market share, it could be that the acquisition of a large firm 
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(relative to the acquiring firm) would present a greater potential for 
managerial diseconomies. In any event, it seems appropriate to include 
a variable to account for the ratio of sizes of the acquiring and 
acquired firms. For industries experiencing more than one merger, this 
variable will represent an average ratio of acquiring firm to acquired 
firm sizes. 
h. Time elapsed since merger Although the various theories of 
diversification do not suggest the length of time necessary for any 
effects on market shares due to conglomerate mergers to arise, it is 
reasonable to expect any effects to become more apparent as the length 
of time increases. Therefore, a variable to reflect the amount of time 
elapsed since the completion of each merger will be included. Again, 
this variable will represent an average elapsed time for the industries 
experiencing more than one merger. 
B. Data: Sources and Problems 
1. Conglomerate merger data 
Data pertaining to conglomerate mergers were obtained from the 
FTC Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions (FTC 1981), and in 
particular, the "Large Mergers in Manufacturing and Mining" series 
(referred to herein as the "Large Mergers" series). To be included in 
the Large Mergers series, the acquired company must have been primarily 
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involved in manufacturing or mining, and must have had assets of at least 
$10 million at the time of acquisition. The series is based on mergers 
for which data were publicly available. According to the report, "the 
exclusion of nonpublic acquisitions does not alter the trends reflected 
[in the statistics]" (FTC 1981, p. 99). For the years 1948-79, "77.5 
percent of the number of large mergers, representing 87.8 percent of 
the total acquired assets, are listed in the report" (FTC 1981, p. 99). 
The reasons for analyzing only large mergers are threefold. First, 
the percentage of all manufacturing and mining assets accounted for by 
firms with assets of $10 million or more is very high, and, due to the 
effects of inflation, increasing. In 1967, this percentage was 84%, and 
it had risen to 96% by 1977 (FTC 1981, p. 106 and p. 114). Second, the 
Large Mergers series excludes very small companies whose acquisition 
would have little, if any, significance with respect to market concen­
tration at the four-digit level. The third reason is that information 
regarding such acquisitions is much more available than information on 
very small firms, likely for the first and second reasons noted above. 
Each acquired and acquiring firm in the Large Mergers series is 
assigned to one four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
industry, based on the primary business activity of the firm. Starting 
in 1970, each firm was assigned by the FTC to one of 450 four-digit 
industries, using data from Dun and Bradstreet. Such a classification 
was appropriate for this study, since the concentration ratios to be 
analyzed were for four-digit industries. However, prior to 1970 the 
67 
acquired and acquiring firms were assigned three-digit codes for broader 
"industry groups," most of which consisted of more than one four-digit 
industry. (In 1977, for example, there were 143 industry groups of the 
450 four-digit industries.) Thus, it was necessary to assign to four-
digit industries firms involved in mergers prior to 1970. This was 
accomplished by the author using information provided at the Dun and 
Bradstreet business library. In general, a company was assigned to the 
four-digit industry that accounted for the largest proportion of that 
firm's business activity in the three digit industry group to which it 
was assigned by the FTC. Often the assignment of a four-digit code was 
clear-cut, though occasionally some judgment was required based on 
Dun and Bradstreet company descriptions. 
Beyond the possibility of misassigning a company, an obvious 
problem arises in assigning diversified companies to one four-digit 
industry. Even if the firm is correctly assigned to its "primary" 
industry, that industry may only account for a small percentage Of 
the firm's total manufacturing activity. Thus, if an acquired firm 
is diversified, there may be significant areas of its activities that 
will not be subject to analysis. Furthermore, if the primary interest 
of an acquiring firm is in one of the acquired firm's secondary areas 
of activity, this method of classification will divert attention away 
from the industry that should be examined. In this case, as in many 
others in industrial organization studies, detailed public data related 
to the diversification of firms' activities would greatly Improve the 
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analysis. This data constraint will tend to bias the results toward 
finding no correlation between conglomerate mergers and changes in con­
centration. Hence, any correlation that Is discovered is more likely 
to reflect the existence of a genuine relationship. 
The next step in preparing the data base for this study involved 
the different FTC classifications of conglomerate mergers: "product 
extension," "market extension," and "other." The FTC definitions of 
each type are as follows (FTC 1981, p. 103): 
product extension: when the acquiring and acquired 
companies are functionally related in production and/or 
distribution, but sell products that do not compete 
directly with one another; 
market extension: when the acquiring and acquired 
companies manufacture the same products, but sell them 
in different geographic markets; 
other: the consolidation of two essentially unrelated 
firms. 
Both product extension and "other" conglomerate mergers could, in 
theory, result in the market share increasing or decreasing effects 
described in Chapter II. Since the difference between these two cate­
gories is often unclear in practice. It was decided not to distinguish 
between them for this study. Market extension mergers could also have 
some of the same effects as the other two types of conglomerate mergers; 
for example, cross-subsidization between a firm's geographic markets. 
69 
However, due to the construction of concentration ratios based on 
national markets, data reflecting any such effects might be adulterated 
by any immediate effect on concentration that results from a market 
extension merger. In this sense, market extension mergers are analogous 
to horizontal mergers. Therefore, it was decided, for purposes of this 
study, to restrict data for conglomerate mergers to product extension 
and "other" conglomerate mergers, and to count any market extension 
mergers as being horizontal rather than conglomerate. 
The final task relating to the merger data was to determine the 
market position of the acquired firms. The lack of publicly available 
market share data for individual manufacturing firms again posed a 
problem in this regard. The resolution of this problem was not entirely 
satisfactory, but seemed preferable to simply ignoring the issue. The 
approach taken was to use an ad hoc combination of FTC data for the 
assets of the acquired firm, census data for the fixed assets of the 
industry to which the firm was assigned, knowledge regarding the nature 
of the acquired firm's diversification, and information from persons 
acquainted with the industry in question. 
The asset data was used to calculate SHARE, a proxy variable to 
represent the percentage of industry assets accounted for by the acquired 
firm: SHÂKE^  = F^ A / I^ A, where F^ A and I^ A are the assets of the jth 
acquired firm and the ith industry, respectively. This measure has two 
main defects. First, the FTC and Census measures of assets differ in that 
the FCC (1981) reports the total assets for firms,^  while the Census 
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1981b) reports only the purchase price of 
fixed, depreciable assets, excluding land and depletable assets such as 
mineral and timber rights. Second, and more important, is the "contam­
ination" of asset data for diversified firms. All of a firm's assets 
are included in the FTC data, though only a portion may by related to 
the industry under investigation. Thus, the use of SHARE to measure a 
firm's percentage of its industry's assets is potentially misleading. 
With this caution in mind, SHARE was then employed to shed light on a 
firm's market position in its industry. It was recognized that the 
implicit assumption in such a process is that firm/industry sales is 
approximated by firm/industry assets, and that this assumption is not 
always correct. In particular, one might expect that for large firms, 
which tend to be more capital-intensive than smaller firms in a given 
industry, SHARE would exceed the firm's market share of sales. This 
problem, in addition to the problems with the asset data, rendered 
SHARE a very incomplete measure for classifying acquired firms to a 
leading or non-leading position. Still, it was useful, especially in 
identifying firms certain to be non-leaders. (Since all of the problems 
mentioned above tend to bias SHARE upward, a very small SHARE would 
almost certainly indicate a relatively small, and thus, non-leading. 
In a phone call to Mr. William Shughart of the FTC, it was deter­
mined that the FTC asset data was obtained from annual reports of the 
firms, the Wall Street Journal, Moody's Investor's Services, and other 
sources. Hence, there is no consistent FTC definition of "assets." 
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firm.) In general, if (CR-4)/10 2 SHARE, the firm was classified as not 
one of the four leading firms; if (CR-8)/20 ^  SHARE, the firm was classi­
fied as not one of the eight leading firms. 
To classify other non-leading firms, and all of the leading firms, 
the qualitative considerations mentioned previously were employed. In 
all cases, only if a firm's market position were nearly certain was it 
classified as leading or non-leading. This conservative approach led, 
as might be expected, to a large number of firms whose market position 
could only be classified as "uncertain." Of the 278 conglomerate mergers 
in the final data sample, 167 were classified as uncertain with respect 
to the four leading firms, and 179 were so classified with respect to 
the eight leading firms. The advantage of such a conservative approach 
is the likelihood that any firms labeled leading or non-leading were 
correctly classified. With respect to the four largest firms in each 
industry in the sample, 20 leading firm and 91 non-leading firm acqui­
sitions were identified; of the eight largest firms, 45 leader and 54 
non-leader acquisitions were identified. 
2. Sample of industries 
Having constructed a conglomerate merger data set as detailed as 
seemed possible under the circumstances, it was necessary to choose a 
time period and industry sample to analyze. The period chosen was 
1967-77. The latter date was chosen to coincide with the most recent 
and available Census of Manufactures, which is performed every five 
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years by the Department of Commerce. The majority of the data from the 
1977 Census were published in 1981 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1981a), 
with special reports still being issued at the present time. The 
decision to begin the analysis in 1967 was made for three reasons. 
First, 1967 was a Department of Commerce Census year. Second, 1967 
was the year that the dramatic increase in conglomerate mergers began. 
Third, the choice of 1967 permitted the use of the preceding census 
data (from the 1963 Census) to construct a crude trend variable for 
concentration, while remaining within a 15-year time frame. This admit-
edly arbitrary limit on the time period to be examined was thought 
necessary to minimize the effects of profound technological changes; 
the farther back in time one looks, the less the "same" econonqr and 
markets can be observed. 
The analysis is restricted to industries in the manufacturing 
sector of the economy. While this focus is more limited than one might 
desire, it is consistent with the majority of empirical work in the 
industrial organization field. This convention can be explained largely 
on the basis of data availability, and can be justified by the fact that 
the manufacturing sector accounts for a plurality of all private sector 
output in the U.S.^  
I^n 1980, 25.4% of private sector gross domestic product in the 
TJ.S. originated in the manufacturing sector, compared to 18.2% in the 
retail and wholesale sector, 16.9% in the finance, insurance and real es­
tate sector, 14.8% in the service sector, 10.5% in'the*transportation and 
utilities sector, 9.3% in the mining and construction sector, and 3.3% 
in the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sector (Council of Economic 
Advisers 1982, p. 244). 
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The 1977 Census of Manufactures (U.S. Department of Commerce 1981a) 
identifies 450 four-digit industries in the manufacturing sector. The 
sample of industries used in this study, however, was substantially 
limited by several factors. First, the Department of Commerce period­
ically redefines manufacturing industries to reflect changing patterns 
of production and consumption. With each revision of industry defini­
tions, some industries are absorbed into others, some new industries 
are identified, and some industries have products added to or deleted 
from their definitions. So, it was necessary to identify industries 
that were consistently defined over the period 1963-77. For purposes 
of this study, "consistently defined" meant that industry definitions 
were not changed or that any changes did not significantly affect the 
comparability of industry statistics over the period, according to the 
Census report. 
Mueller and Hamm (1974) note that the choice of unchanged indus­
tries (industries that have not been redefined over a period of time) 
may render the sample unrepresentative of all manufacturing industries, 
introducing a bias into the analysis. However, they determined that 
their sample of unchanged industries was "quite representative both as 
to trend and level of industry concentration" (Mueller and Hamm 1974, 
p. 512). The same is true of the sample in this study. Furthermore, 
Caves and Porter (1980, p. 3) point out that "If the sample excludes 
new and fast growing industries, it also excludes declining sectors 
that have been consolidated with other industries [and, hence,] such 
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a sample is not necessarily biased." 
A second factor that limited the choice of sample industries 
concerned the coverage ratio reported in the census data, which reflects 
the proportion of shipments classified to an industry that were produced 
by plants classified to that industry. If a "large" percentage of an 
industry's products are produced at plants classified to other indus­
tries, the concentration ratio for the industry in question becomes 
less meaningful. It was hoped that excluding industries with a coverage 
ratio less than 80% (an admittedly arbitrary cut-off level) would mini­
mize this problem. 
It was determined that 206 industries were consistently defined 
over the period 1963-77 and also had a coverage ratio greater than or 
equal to 80%. However, 13 of the 206 industries with consistent and 
satisfactory census data lacked data from other sources, or consisted 
of extremely diverse products categorized by the Bureau of the Census 
as "not elsewhere classified." The exclusion of those industries left 
193 industries in the basic data sample. 
3. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable for the analysis is the change in industry 
concentration between 1967 and 1977 in the sample industries. The 
changes in both the four-firm and eight-firm concentration ratios were 
calculated from Census of Manufactures data (U.S. Department of Commerce 
1981a, Table 7) in two different ways. First, the variables CHNGCR4 and 
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CHNGCR8 were calculated as follows for the absolute change in concen­
tration in each industry 1: 
CHNGCR4^  = CR-4^  ^ - CR-4^  ^ i = 1, 2, 193; 
CHNGCRS^  = CR-8^  ^ - CR-8j.^  1^ 67 i = 1, 2, 193. 
Second, the proportional change in four- and eight-firm concen­
tration, PR0CHNG4 and PROCHKGS, respectively, were calculated for each 
industry i as follows: 
PRDCHSC4. = (CR-4^ _ 1,7, " CR-4^ _ ise?"»"" " 1967> 
i » 1, 2 193; 
PSOCmiGS^  . (CE-8^  ^1,77 " 1967"«"° " 1967> 
1 = 1, 2 193. 
4. Independent variables 
a. CONGMERG^ ; L4MERG^ ; NL4MERG^ ; U4MERG^ ; LSMERG^ ; NLSMERG^ ; 
USMERG^  These variables represent the amount of large 
conglomerate merger activity in each industry i, as detailed by the FTC 
Large Mergers series, and described in Subsection 1 of this section. 
CONGMERG^  is simply the number of conglomerate mergers occurring in 
industry i. The other six variables represent the classification of 
firms acquired in the mergers as leading firm (L), non-leading firm (NL), 
or uncertain (U), with respect to the four (4) or eight (8) industry 
leaders. (See subsection 1 above for a discussion of how this classifi­
cation was accomplished.) 
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On the assumption that any effects of conglomerate mergers on the 
market shares of acquired firms would not arise immediately, it was 
decided to ignore mergers that occurred during 1977, the year on which 
the 1977 concentration ratios are based. So, the 278 mergers analyzed 
in the study occurred during the period 1967-76. 
Finally, it was necessary to adjust the data for firms that were 
acquired more than once during the sample period, to the extent that 
such information was available. Again, a one-year time limit was decided 
upon. If the two acquisitions occurred within twelve months of each 
other, they were counted as one merger on the assumption that the orig­
inal merger had insufficient time to affect market shares. If more than 
twelve months separated the two acquisitions, they were counted sepa­
rately. 
Each regression equation employed either CONGMERG or the appro­
priate group of leading, non-leading, and uncertain variables. In light 
of the conflicting theories regarding the effects of conglomerate mergers, 
the signs of the coefficients on these variables were not predicted. 
b. DCONS^ ; DPROD^ ; DMIX^  These are "dumny" variables that 
take on a value of one when identifying an industry as producing primar­
ily consumer goods (DCONS), producer goods (DPROD), or both (DMIX), and 
have a value of zero otherwise. For approximately one-half of the 
sample, this designation was accomplished using 1972 Input-Output (I-O) 
data for the U.S. economy (U.S. Department of Commerce 1979, Table 1). 
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With these data, it was possible to construct a ratio, R^ , as follows: 
= PCE./TCO^ , 
where PCE^  is the amount of personal consumption expenditures on the 
total commodity output (TCO^ ) for each industry i. If R^  equalled or 
exceeded 70%, the industry was classified as a consumer-goods industry; 
if was less than or equal to 30%, the industry was classified as a 
produced-goods industry; industries for which R^  fell between 30% and 
70% were classified as mixed-goods industries. (This classification is 
similar to that used in Scherer (1979).) 
Due to differences between 1-0 industry classifications and the 
SIC system, for approximately one-half of the sample industries it was 
not possible to calculate In most of these instances, it was clear 
how to classify the industries in question (e.g., "men's and boy's 
trousers," and "blast furnaces and steel mills").. The few industries 
for which the appropriate classification was less certain were put in 
the mixed-goods category (e.g., "woven carpets and rugs"). The final 
result was the identification of 57 consumer-goods industries, 112 
producer-goods industries, and 24 mixed-goods industries in the sample. 
The theory and evidence discussed in subsection A-2-a of this chapter led 
to an expectation that the coefficient on DCONS^  would be positive; the 
coefficient signs for DPROD^  and DMIX^  were not predicted. 
c. ENTRYCensus of Manufactures data (U.S. Department of 
Commerce 1981a, Table 7) for the number of companies in each industry 
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were used to calculate the proportional change in the number of firms 
in each industry during the period 1967-77 as follows: 
ENTRY^  = (COS^  ^1977 " 1967^ 1967 
where COS^  is the number of companies classified to each industry i in 
1967 and 1977. It was expected that ENTRY^  would have a negative 
coefficient. 
d. CHNGSHIP^  This variable is included to reflect the propor­
tional change in business activity for each industry during the period 
1967-77. It was calculated, using Census of Manufactures data (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 1981a, Table 7) as follows: 
CHSGSHIP^  - 1967 
where for most industries SHIP^  represents the value of industry ship­
ments in industry i in 1967 and 1977, deflated by the producer price 
index for all commodities for that year (U.S. Department of Commerce 
1980, p. 36). For eight of the industries in the sample, however, the 
census data.report the value-added or the value of production by the 
industry, rather than the value of shipments. Because the variable 
reflects proportional change, because an industry's value of shipments 
is used in calculating its value-added, and because value of production 
and value of shipments are so closely related, it was felt that this 
data inconsistency was not a significant problem. CHNGSHIP^  was 
expected to have a negative coefficient. 
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e. CHCR467^ ; CHCR867^  Variables to reflect the change in each 
Industry's four- and eight-firm concentration ratios during the period 
1967-77 were calculated as follows: 
CHCR467^  = CR.4^ _ - CR-4^ _ ,,^ 3 
CHCR867^  = C8.-8^ _ - CR-8^ _ i,;, 
where the subscript i identifies each industry. The four- and eight-firm 
concentration ratios for 1967 and 1963 were obtained from the Census of 
Manufactures (U.S. Department of Commerce 1981a). For reasons discussed 
previously, no prediction was made concerning the expected sign of these 
variables' coefficients. 
f. HZMERG. A variable to account for the number of horizontal 1 
plus market extension mergers in each industry 1 was constructed from 
the FTC Large Mergers series (FTC 1981). Since the immediate effects 
of horizontal mergers completed during 1967 are reflected in the 1967 
concentration ratios, only mergers completed during the period 1968-77 
are included in the data for this variable. Without classifying such 
mergers as "leading" or "non-leading," It is not possible to predict 
the sign of the coefficient on HZMERG^ . FTC and Department of Justice 
scrutiny of these mergers for antitrust violations, though, suggests 
that such mergers as are permitted may be more likely to have a de-
concentrating effect, if any. (Recall from the discussion in Chapter I 
the relatively tough standards of legality applied to horizontal mergers 
during the mid-to-late 1960s.) If so, a negative sign on the coefficient 
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might be expected. 
g. ARATIO^  The FTC Large îfergers series (FTC 1981) provides 
data on the total assets of the acquired and acquiring firms in each 
merger reported. From this data was calculated a variable, ABATIO^ , 
reflecting the ratio, A^ , of acquiring to acquired firm assets for the 
jth merger. Since the effects of a conglomerate merger on the market 
share of an acquired firm are thought to be more likely the higher this 
ratio is, the variable was expected to take on the same sign as the 
conglomerate merger variables. Because the coefficient sign on those 
variables is not unambiguously predicted by the theory, no more precise 
prediction was made with regard to the sign of the coefficient on 
ARATIO^ . The variable was calculated as follows; 
N 
AEATIO. = ( Z A.)/N 
where A^  is defined as above, and N is the number of mergers in each 
industry i. 
h. TIME^  Using FTC Large Mergers series data (FTC 1981), it 
was possible to determine the number of months, M^ , elapsed between the 
completion of the jth merger in an industry and the end of 1977. TIME^  
is the variable included to account for that information. It was calcu­
lated as follows: 
N 
TIME. = ( S M.)/N 
j=l  ^
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where is defined as above, and N is the number of mergers in each 
industry i. For reasons analogous to those regarding ARATIO^ , the sign 
of the coefficient on TIME^  was simply predicted to be the same as that 
of the conglomerate merger variable coefficients. 
5. The complete model 
The primary models used for estimation purposes, then, are the 
combinations implied in the following: 
Y. = a.M. + a.DCONS. + a-DPROD^  + a, mix, + a^ ENTRY. i 1 1 2 1 3 i 4 i 5 i 
agCHNGSHIP^  + a^ CHCR4(8)67^  + agHZMERG^ . + a^ TIME^  
ttj^ QARAIIO^  + 
where Y^  is the absolute or proportional change in CR-4 or CR-8, and 
represents either CONGMERG^  or L4(8)MERG^ , NL(4)MERG^ , and U4(8)MERG^ , 
and is the error term. Variations on this basic model and subsamples 
examined, as well as the regression results, are discussed in the 
following chapter. 
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V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this chapter, empirical results from the investigation of 193 
manufacturing industries are presented. Section Â describes the 
observed changes in four-firm and eight-firm concentration ratios for 
the industries in the entire sample, and for the subsamples of consumer-
goods industries, producer-goods industries, and mixed-goods industries. 
The analysis also considers changes in industry concentration in terms 
of the amount of conglomerate merger activity experienced by the 
industries. Section B reports and interprets the results of multiple 
regression analysis of the changes in four-firm and eight-firm concen­
tration ratios for the entire sample, and for various subsamples. 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
1. Four-firm concentration ratios, 1967-77 
The average four-firm concentration ratio (CR-4) for the entire 
sample of 193 industries exhibited very little change between 1967 and 
1977, increasing by 0.2 percentage points. (See Table 2.) This change 
reflected a 0.4 point increase 1967-72 and a 0.2 point decrease 1972-77. 
Looking at individual Industries, it is found that roughly the 
same number (89) experienced decreases in CR-4 as experienced increases 
in CR-4 (87); 17 industries had the same CR-4 in 1967 and 1977. 
The industries for which CR-4 increased had in 1967 an average 
Table 2. Average levels and changes in four-firm concentration 
Consumer goods 
Entire (57 industries) 
sample With no With one or 
(193 conglomerate more conglom-
industries) All mergers erate mergers 
All industries 
Average level, 1967 
Average level, 1977 
Average change, 1967-77 
Average change, 1963-67 
Average change, 1967-72 
Average change, 1972-77 
38.9 
39.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.4 
-0.2 
36.8 
40.4 
3.5 
1.6 
2.1 
1.4 
38.9 
43.3 
4.4 
35.1 
37.9 
2.8 
Industries with an increase 
in concentration, 1967-77 
Number of industries 
Average increase, 1967-77 
Average level, 1967 
Average level, 1977 
87 
6.4 
37.2 
43.6 
38 
7.8 
18 
8.9 
20 
6.8 
Industries with a decrease 
in concentration, 1967-77 
Number of industries 
Average decrease, 1967-77 
Average level, 1967 
Average level, 1977 
89 
-5.7 
41.9 
36.2 
17 
-5.6 
7 
-6.7 
10 
—4.8 
Industries with no change 
in concentration, 1967-77 
Number of industries 
Average level, 1967 and 1977 
17 
31.5 
2 1 1 
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Producer goods Mixed goods 
(112 industries) (24 industries) 
With no With one or With no With one or 
conglomerate more conglom- conglomerate more conglom-
All mergers erate mergers All mergers erate mergers 
39.6 38.2 40.6 
38.7 37.9 39.2 
—0.9 —0.3 —1.4 
-0.4 
-0.4 
-0.5 
42 18 24 
5.3 7.2 3.8 
56 23 33 
-5.8 -6.3 -5.5 
14 7 7 
40.4 36.6 42.7 
38.4 37.7 38.9 
-2.0 1.1 -3.8 
—0.6 
0.3 
-2.3 
7 5 2 
5.7 7.0 2.5 
16 4 12 
-5.5 -6.3 -5.3 
10 1 
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CR-4 lower than the average for the entire sample, and by 1977 had an 
average CR-4 higher than the average for the entire sample. The average 
CR-4 for those industries experiencing a decrease went from higher than 
the sample average in 1967 to lower than the sample average in 1977. In 
other words, it was not, on average, the most concentrated industries 
that experienced increases in CR-4. 
For those industries that showed a decline in CR-4, the average 
decline during the period 1967-72 (-2.9 points) was approximately equal 
to the average decline during 1972-77 (-2.8 points). However, for those 
industries with increasing CR-4 over the ten-year period the average 
increase during the first five years (3.9 points) was greater than during 
the second five years (2.5 points). These facts are somewhat surprising, 
considering that the Department of Commerce index of manufacturing 
production (U.S. Department of Commerce 1980, p. 9) rose by 18.9% in 
the first period and by only 16.4% in the second period, the difference 
being largely due to the 1974-75 recession. One might expect dominant 
firms to be better able than smaller firms to protect or increase their 
market shares during business downturns, whereas vigorous industry 
growth would provide smaller firms a better opportunity to cut into 
the market shares of industry leaders (Mueller and Hamm 1974, p. 514; 
Shepherd 1964, pp. 204-6). If so, 1967-72 would, ceteris paribus, be 
apt to e^ ibit smaller increases or greater decreases in CR-4 than the 
period 1972-77, but such was not the case. 
The evidence discussed to this point does not support the 
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conclusion of Caves and Porter (1980, p. 3) that "a rather rapid 
increase in concentration was under way in the early 1970s." At most, 
if such a rapid increase were under way in the manufacturing sector, it 
appears to have slowed or stalled by the mid-1970s. 
Previous studies (Mueller and Hamm 1974; Scherer 1979; Caves and 
Porter 1980) have noted that the calm surface of changes in average 
industry concentration hides significant changes below the surface 
with respect to concentration in consumer-goods and producer-goods 
industries. The same conclusion can be drawn from this study. The 57 
consumer-goods industries are seen to have had a 3.5 point increase in 
average CR-4 (2.1 points 1967-72, 1.4 points 1972-77), with more indus­
tries experiencing increases (38) than decreases (17). Furthermore, 
the average increase for those 38 industries (7.8 points) was greater 
than the average decrease for those experiencing a decline in CR-4 
(-5.6 points). These figures indicate that the trend toward increasing 
concentration in consumer-goods industries noted by Mueller and Hamm 
(1974), Scherer (1979), and Caves and Porter (1980) continued through 
the mid-1970s. By 1977, the average CR-4 for consumer-goods industries 
in the sample was higher than that for producer-goods industries in the 
sample. This was primarily due to the increase in the consumer-goods 
CR-4 rather than to the slight decrease in the average producer-goods CR-4 
discussed below. To the extent that market concentration reflects the 
market power of the leading firms, then, the continuation of this trend 
is cause for concern. 
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The evidence from 112 producer-goods industries is also broadly 
consistent with that from previous studies. More such industries 
showed decreases in CR-4 (56) than increases (42), and the average CR-4 
over the period 1967-77 fell by -0.9 points (-0.4 points 1967-72, -0.5 
points 1972-77). Looking at the groups that exhibited increases or 
decreases one finds that the average decrease (-5.8 points) was slightly 
larger than the average increase (5.3 points). The only significant 
difference between these results and those from previous studies is the 
lack of evidence that producer-goods CR-4s were increasing in the late 
1960s, a "possible reversal of trend" noted by Mueller and Earnm (1974, 
p. 519) and corroborated by Caves and Porter (1980). The reason for 
this difference is likely related to the somewhat different sample of 
industries (due to changes in SIC industry definitions) and the three-way 
classification of industries, into consumer-, producer- and mixed-goods 
categories, in the present study. (The two studies just mentioned used 
only the consumer- and producer-goods categories.) Which result is more 
representative of all producer-goods industries is difficult to deter­
mine, but the actual change in the late 1960s, whether an Increase or a 
decrease, was apparently quite small. 
Those 24 industries that were classified as "mixed-goods" indus­
tries exhibited characteristics qualitatively similar to the producer-
goods industries, with a decrease in average CR-4 of -2.0 points (+0.3 
points 1967-72, -2.3 points 1972-77). More of these industries experi­
enced decreases in CR-4 (16) than experienced increases (7), and one 
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had the same CR-4 in 1967 and 1977. It is not clear why this "inter­
mediate" group exhibited proportionately more and larger decreases in 
CR-4 than the producer-goods industries. The relatively small number 
of industries in this group, however, surely limits its usefulness in 
analyzing trends in manufacturing industries as a whole; its primary 
purpose was to allow the creation of more purely consumer-oriented and 
producer-oriented subgroups. 
The changes in CR-4s discussed above can also be described with 
regard to the amount of conglomerate merger activity that occurred in 
the various sample subgroups. First, there was no apparent tendency 
for conglomerate merger activity to occur more frequently or less 
frequently in consumer-goods industries than in producer-goods indus­
tries. This conclusion is based on the ratio of consumer-goods indus­
tries to producer-goods industries (57:112), compared to the ratios of 
consumer-goods industries to producer-goods industries experiencing 
zero conglomerate mergers (26:48), one conglomerate merger (17:32), 
and more than one conglomerate merger (14:32). 
The second observation that can be made with respect to CR-4 
changes and conglomerate mergers is that industries experiencing such 
mergers seem to exhibit smaller increases and smaller decreases in CR-4 
compared to industries with zero conglomerate mergers. This conclusion 
is based on the average increase in CR-4 among those industries experi­
encing increases, and the average decrease in CR-4 among those industries 
experiencing decreases. Whether one looks at consumer-goods industries. 
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producer-goods Industries, or mixed-goods industries, the average 
increase in CR-4 is smaller and the average decrease in CR-4 is smaller 
in the industries experiencing one or more conglomerate mergers. This 
apparent effect will be referred to hereinafter as the "dampening 
relation" between conglomerate mergers and changes in CR-4. %en one 
looks at all producer-goods industries, it appears that conglomerate 
mergers are associated with greater decreases in CR-4. However, this 
is a result of combining decreases in such industries with increases 
that are smaller in number and magnitude. In other words, the dampening 
relation between conglomerate mergers and changes in industry concen­
tration is stronger with respect to increases in CR-4 than it is with 
respect to decreases in CR-4. 
In the smaller and, hence, less reliable, .subsample of mixed-goods 
industries this dampening relation would, by itself, lead to a statis­
tical illusion similar to that just described. Also, in mixed-goods 
industries there is a strong tendency for conglomerate mergers to be 
associated with decreases in CR-4. Whether this represents a genuine 
relationship or a random association is not certain. 
In summary, then, the evidence from the descriptive statistics 
for four-firm concentration indicates the following: consumer-goods 
industries have continued their trend toward increasing CR-4s, and 
producer-goods industries have continued (or reverted to) their trend 
of slight decreases in CR-4s; neither type of industry seems more likely 
than the other to experience conglomerate mergers; and, conglomerate 
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mergers seem to be associated with a dampening of changes in CR-4s, 
whether increases or decreases; in one small subsample (mixed-goods 
industries) conglomerate mergers are associated with a disproportion­
ately large number of decreases in CR-4. 
2. Eight-firm concentration ratios, 1967-77 
The evidence regarding eight-firm concentration ratios (CR-8s) 
is similar in most respects to that from the CR-4 analysis. (See 
Table 3.) One difference is that the dampening relation is not as 
consistent: producer-goods industries experiencing increases in CR-8 
had an average increase of 6.2 points regardless of whether or not 
they had experienced conglomerate mergers. Also, the average decrease 
in CR-8 for mixed-goods industries exhibiting decreases is greater in 
the group experiencing conglomerate mergers. The dampening relation 
for decreases in consumer-goods industries' CR-8 is barely noticeable. 
However, the dampening relation for increases in CR-8 in consumer-goods 
and mixed-goods industries, and for decreases in CR-8 in producer-goods 
industries, is as strong or stronger than in the CR-4 evidence. 
The other notable result observed regarding CR-8s is that the 
average decline for both the producer-goods and the mixed-goods indus­
tries (-0.6 and -0.8, respectively) is smaller than the average decline 
in CR-4 in those industries. This means that the combined market share 
of the fifth through the eighth largest firms in such industries was 
increasing during the period 1967-77. Consumer-goods industries, 
Table 3. Average levels and changes in eight-firm concentration 
Consumer goods 
Entire (57 industries) 
sample With no With one or 
(193 conglomerate more conglom^  
industries) All mergers erate mergers 
All industries 
Average level, 1967 52.0 48.8 50.8 47.1 
Average level, 1977 52.8 53.1 56.5 50.3 
Average change, 1967-77 0.8 4.3 5.7 3.2 
Average change, 1963-67 0.5 1.8 
Average change, 1967-72 0.8 2.7 
Average change, 1972-77 0.1 1.6 
Industries with an increase 
in concentration, 1967-77 
Number of industries 85 36 17 19 
Average increase, 1967-77 7.5 9.1 10.9 7.4 
Average level, 1967 46.8 
Average level, 1977 54.3 
Industries with a decrease 
in concentration, 1967-77 
Number of industries 96 19 9 10 
Average decrease, 1967-77 -4.9 -4.2 -4.2 -4.1 
Average level, 1967 54.2 
Average level, 1977 49.3 
Industries with no change 
in concentration, 1967-77 
Number of industries 12 2 0 2 
Average level, 1967 and 1977 71.4 
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Producer goods Mixed goods 
• (112 industries) (24 industries) 
With no With one or With no With one or 
conglomerate more conglom- conglomerate more conglom-
All mergers erate mergers All mergers erate mergers 
53.3 50.8 55.2 
52.7 50.5 54.4 
—0.6 —0.3 —0.8 
-0.1 
-0 .2  
-0.4 
41 22 19 
6 . 2  6 . 2  6 , 2  
62 23 39 
—5.2 —6.4 —4.4 
9 3 6 
53.6 46.1 58.1 
52.9 49.0 55.2 
-0.8 2.9 -2.9 
0.2 
0.7 
-1.5 
8 4 4 
6.9 10.3 3.5 
15 5 10 
—4.9 —3.0 —5.8 
10 1 
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however, exhibited a larger increase in CR-8 than in CR-4, pointing to 
increases in shares for the fifth through eighth largest firms as well 
as for the four largest firms. These results are consistent with evi­
dence reported by Caves and Porter (1980), and they indicate a more 
generalized trend toward increases in industrial concentration than the 
average figures for CR-8 or the CR-4 data alone might suggest. It 
should be noted, though, that stronger fifth through eighth largest 
firms may result in more competition in an industry, due to their 
increased ability to do competitive battle with the larger firms. This 
possibility has received some empirical support from Miller (1967; 1971). 
B. Regression Results 
The regression results reported here are obtained primarily from 
two models. As described in Chapter IV, one model employs a broad 
range of independent variables; the other is an abbreviated version 
of that model, using fewer independent variables. In addition, results 
from several regressions that are of interest, but fall into neither of 
the above-mentioned categories, are discussed. 
Four groupings of the industries in the sample are analyzed: 
the entire sample of 193 industries, the 83 industries which experienced 
no conglomerate mergers, the 50 industries which had only one conglom­
erate merger, and the 99 industries with one or more conglomerate 
mergers. Eleven of the 193 industries in the main sample are not 
94 
analyzed in any of the subsamples, due to a lack of data for calculating 
the independent variable ARATIO. 
In Chapter IV, the variables used in the regression model are 
defined, the data sources used to construct the variables are discussed, 
and the expected signs of the variables' coefficients are given. Table 4 
below is a summary of the variables and their expected signs. 
Table 4. Regression model variables and expected coefficient signs 
Dependent variable Independent variables Expected coefficient signs 
CHNGCR4(8) 
DCONS positive 
DPROD 
DMIX 
ENTRY 
CHNGSHIP 
CHCR4(8)67 
HZMERG 
CONGMERG 
NL4(8)MERG 
L4(8)MERG 
U4(8)MERG 
ARATIO 
TIME 
positive or negative 
positive or negative 
negative 
negative 
positive or negative 
positive or negative 
positive or negative 
positive or negative 
positive or negative 
positive or negative 
positive or negative 
positive or negative 
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As might be expected, there is evidence of correlation between 
several pairs of the independent variables. However, of the correlation 
coefficients (other than those for the dumny variables) that are signifi­
cantly different from zero at the 5% level, none is larger that 0.47 
and only four are larger than 0.3 (HZMERG correlated with NL4MERG (.41), 
NL8MERG (.47), and CONOIERG (.37), and ENTRY correlated with CHNGSHIP 
(.43)). 
The results reported in the following subsections are from the 
estimation of models that are linear in all variables. Preliminary 
equations that employed quadratic and cubic conglomerate merger variables 
were also estimated, but these variables were not found to be statis­
tically significant, separately or jointly. 
1. Estimation of the model using all independent variables 
As explained in Chapter III, both the absolute change in CR-4 and 
the proportional change (as defined there) have significance in economic 
theory. Hence, the model was originally estimated using those alterna­
tive measures of changes in concentration, and the results were consis­
tently similar in terms of the signs of the coefficients. However, 
equally consistent were the slightly lower levels of significance of 
2 
coefficients and the slightly lower R s of the regressions using the 
unconventionally defined proportional change as the dependent variable. 
Therefore, having noted the generally less successful attempt to use such 
a variable, the results presented in Tables 5 and 6 are those employing 
1 2 
Table 5. Regression results: complete model * 
193 industries 83 industries with no 
conglomerate mergers 
Variable ACR-4 ACR-8 ACR-4 ACR-8 
DCONS 3.76* 
(3.70) 
3.87* 
(3.71) 
4.45* 
(4.37) 
4.69* 
(4.47) 
3.16^  
(1.99) 
4.18* 
(2.78) 
DPROD 0.15 
(0.20) 
0.13 
(0.17) 
0.42 
(0.55) 
0.45 
(0.58) 
-0.03 
(-0.03) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
DMIX -1.22 
(-0.79) 
-1.09 
(-0.70) 
-0.27 
(-0.18) 
0.10 
(0.06) 
-1.20 
(-0.46) 
0.15 
(0.06) 
ENTRY -4.29* 
(-3.31) 
-4.30* 
(-3.30) 
-6.32* 
(-4.94) 
-6.33* 
(-4.94) 
-13.80* 
(-4.54) 
-16.23* 
(-6.06) 
CHNGSHIP -0.79 
(-0.64) 
-0.82 
(-0.67) 
0.18 
(0.15) 
0.13 
(0.10) 
1.20 
(0.64) 
2.17 
(1.27) 
CHCR4(8)67 0.06 
(0.50) 
0.06 
(0.44) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.07 
(-0.30) 
-0.10 
(-0.44) 
HZMERG 0.33 
(0.61) 
0.32 
(0.58) 
0.21 
(0.40) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
-0.53 
(-0.23) 
-1.44 
(—0.68) 
CONGMERG -0.29 
(-1.05) 
-0.17 
(—0.64) 
L4(8)MERG -0.98 
(-0.69) 
-0.87 
(-0.88) 
NL4(8)MERG -0.17 
(-0.36) 
0.50 
(0.74) 
U4(8)MERG -0.30 
(-0.80) 
-0.27 
(-0.78) 
ASATIO 
TIME 
R2 
.15 .14 .21 .20 .30 .43 
N 193 193 193 193 83 83 
t^-ratios in parentheses. 
2 Significance levels (uppercase for 2-tailed tests, lowercase 
for 1-tailed tests): A,a - 1%; B,b - 5%; C,c - 10%. 
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99 industries withj>l 50 industries with 1 
conglomerate merger conglomerate merger 
ACR-4 ACR-8 ACR-4 ACR-8 
1.70 1.20 4.16^  3.94C 5.12^  5.66= 
(0.72) (0.48) (1.66) (1.45) (1.46) (1.41) 
-1.15 -1.38 1.55 1.53 3.01 4.22 
(-0.49) (-0.58) (0.63) (0.61) (0.96) (1.28) 
-3.24 -3.63 -0.45 -0.60 0.77 0.02 
(-1.14) (-1.26) (-0.15) (-0.19) (0.17) (0.003) 
-1.00 -0.96 -2.67^  -2.65^  0.53 -1.58 
(-0.77) (-0.73) (-1.94) (-1.91) (0.26) (-0.73) 
-0.51 -0.51 0.28 0.34 1.25 -0.09 
(-0.28) (-0.28) (0.15) (0.17) (0.42) (-0.03) 
0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.12 -0.34 
(0.05) (0.12) (-0.04) (-0.05) (-0.47) (-1.03) 
0.38 0.49 0.23 0.24 4.84® 4.85® 
(0.75) (0.95) (0.43) (0.41) (2.53) (2.36) 
-0.28 -0.28 
(-0.92) (-0.89) 
0.52 0.07 -1.13 0.003 
(0.34) (0.05) (-0.34) (0.001) 
-0.56 -0.29 -5.71® -4.22 
(-1.26) (-0.44) (-2.20) (-0.85) 
-0.12 -0.35 
(-0.30) (-0.89) 
-0.10 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 
(-0.53) (-0.44) (-0.22) (-0.21) (-0.43) (-0.21) 
0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 
(0.54) (0.58) (-0.48) (-0.45) (-1.02) (-1.17) 
.04 .02 
m
 
0
 .02 .30 .29 
99 99 99 99 50 50 
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only the absolute change in concentration ratios. 
In the regressions for the sample of 193 industries, DCONS, ENTRY 
and CHNGSHIP have the predicted sign, with the exception of CHNGSHIP in 
the CR-8 equations (Table 5). However, only the coefficients on DCONS 
and ENTRY are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. None 
of the other control variables (those with unpredicted coefficient 
signs) have coefficients significantly different from zero. (ARATIO 
and TIME are not used in these equations due to the inclusion in this 
sample of industries with zero conglomerate mergers.) Seven of the 
eight conglomerate merger variables have negative coefficients, but none 
of these coefficients are significantly different from zero. These 
results are found in both the CR-4 and the CR-8 analyses, with the dif-
_2 ferences between the two being the higher R and the larger significant 
—2 
coefficients (with higher t-ratios) in the CR-8 equations. (R is the 
2 
R statistic adjusted for degrees of freedom (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1981, 
p. 80).) 
Similar results are obtained from the subsample of 99 industries 
with one or more conglomerate mergers, with the notable exceptions that 
the coefficients on DCONS and ENTRY are insignificantly different from 
zero in the CR-4 equations, and are smaller and less statistically sig­
nificant (relative to the 193-industry sample) in the CR-8 equations. 
Comparison of the results for these two samples might suggest 
that conglomerate mergers are associated with the weakening of the 
effects of some factors related to changes in concentration in manu-
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facturing industries. This possibility is suggested by the fact that 
it was after removing industries with zero conglomerate mergers from 
the sample that DCONS and ENTRY became insignificant or less significant. 
If conglomerate mergers are associated with a weakening or reversal of 
relationships that otherwise exist in manufacturing industries, the 
contrast should be evident when comparing the 99 industries just dis­
cussed with the 83 industries experiencing no conglomerate mergers 
between 1967 and 1977. The results from regressions using data from 
these 83 industries, while not entirely consistent, do lend some support 
to such an interpretation. 
In the 83-industry subsample, the coefficients on ENTRY are larger 
in absolute value, and more statistically significant, than in comparable 
equations estimated for other samples, and DCONS is once again signifi­
cantly, positively related to the change in industry concentration. 
Also, the coefficients on HZMERG are negative, albeit insignificantly 
different from zero, whereas they are positive in the other samples (and 
significantly so in the 50-industry subsample discussed below). Further-
—2 
more, it should be noted that the R s for both of these equations are 
higher than those obtained from regressions on the other samples. 
Weighed against the evidence just discussed is the fact that the 
t-ratios for DCONS' coefficients, while larger than in the 99-industry 
equations, are not larger than in the 193-industry equations. If con­
glomerate mergers are associated with the weakening of the effect of 
this variable, the highest t-ratios would be expected in the regressions 
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using data from the 83 industries without conglomerate mergers, and 
this is not what is found. 
Recall from Chapter II that it is not clear from, economic theory 
whether multiple conglomerate mergers in an industry would make any 
effects of conglomerate mergers more likely or less likely to arise. 
Thus, it seemed important to examine a set of industries experiencing 
just one conglomerate merger in order to shed light on this question. 
One notable result, shown in Table 5, is the large and significantly 
negative coefficient on NL4MERG in the 50-industry subsample. This is 
the only evidence found among these regressions that supports the con­
ventional economic theories regarding the competitive effects of con­
glomerate mergers. In light of the negative coefficients on virtually 
all of the conglomerate merger variables, one should hesitate to give 
this bit of evidence a conventional interpretation. At this point, the 
result is simply noted, and the interpretation is left to a subsequent 
section, pending a more complete discussion of all regression results. 
Other results to be noted from the regressions for the 50-industry 
subsample include the significant postive coefficient on HZMER6 (a 
reversal of the results from the 83 industries with zero conglomerate 
mergers) and the negative (though insignificant) coefficients on the 
trend variables, CHCR4(8)67. Also, note that DCONS and ENTRY are not 
significant at the 5% level, although DCONS is significant at the 10% 
level. 
Summarizing the results from all of the regressions discussed so 
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far, there Is no evidence of an association between conglomerate mergers 
and increases in industry concentration. There is found, on the contrary, 
consistent but weak or insignificant evidence of a relation between 
conglomerate mergers and decreases in industry concentration. The 
statistically insignificant coefficients on ÂRÂT10 fail to support the 
hypothesis that large conglomerate firms will use their "deep pockets" 
to subsidize market share increases for their acquisitions. The insig­
nificant coefficients on TIME do not suggest that the effects of conglom­
erate mergers become more noticeable over time. Also, there is some 
evidence that the effects of non-conglomerate factors on concentration 
are weakened by the occurrence of conglomerate mergers into an industry. 
2. Estimation of the model with fewer independent variables 
It is the case that if two independent variables are significantly 
correlated, the estimated standard errors of their coefficients will 
tend to be large, causing their t-ratios to be lower than otherwise. It 
has been suggested (Intrilligator 1978, p. 155) that if one of the 
correlated variables has been included on the basis of casual or ad hoc 
reasoning (as opposed to firm and well-developed economic theory) it 
might be appropriate to omit that variable in an attempt to isolate 
significant economic relationships. Furthermore, if the correlation 
is not extremely large, and if the coefficient on the omitted variable 
were small, the resulting bias in the estimated coefficient of the 
remaining variable would be reduced (Intrilligator 1978, pp. 188-89). 
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For these reasons, then, it is appropriate to estimate the model after 
omitting the variables DPROD DMIX, CHNGSHIP, ARAIIO, and TIME. The 
results of those regressions are presented in Table 6 and discussed in 
this subsection. 
In general, the performance of the conglomerate merger variables 
is similar in these regressions to the results discussed in the previous 
subsection. Twenty-one of 24 conglomerate merger variables have negative 
coefficients, but only one of these is significantly different from 
zero: the coefficient on 1IL4MERG in the 50-industry subsample. With 
the exception of that one significant conglomerate merger variable, 
leading firm and non-leading firm mergers are again not found to have 
different effects on changes in industry concentration. 
More change is occasionally observed in the performance of the 
control variables, though only in two cases did a variable pass or fail 
the test for statistical significance that it had previously failed or 
passed. The first instance occurred in the CR-4 and CR-8 equations for 
the 99-industry subsample, where the coefficient on DCONS increased in 
magnitude and became significantly different from zero. Second, in 
the 50-industry subsample the HZMERG coefficient dropped below the 5% 
level of significance in one of four regressions, though it remained 
significant at the 10% level in that instance. 
Overall, the results from these regressions would seem to slightly 
weaken the tentative conclusion, based on the regressions in the pre­
ceding subsection, that conglomerate mergers are associated with a 
•1 2 Table 6. Regression results: abbreviated model ' 
193 industries 83 Industries 
with no conglom­
erate mergers 
Variable ACR-4 ACR -8 ACR-4 ACR-8 
Constant -0.19 
(-0.26) 
-0.20 
(-0.28) 
0.35 
(0.50) 
0.42 
(0.59) 
-0.03 
(-0.03) 
0.37 
(0.40) 
DCONS 3.87* 
(3.39) 
4.00* 
(3.43) 
4.15* 
(3.70) 
4.32* 
(3.77) 
3.48^  
(1.92) 
4.38* 
(2.60) 
ENTRY -4.56* 
(-3.96) 
-4.61* 
(-3.97) 
-6.19* 
(-5.43) 
-6.25* 
(-5.46) 
-12.47* 
(-5.34) 
-14.23* 
(-6.76) 
CHCR4{8)67 0.07 
(0.57) 
0.06 
(0.49) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.05 
(-0.22) 
-0.10 
(-0.45) 
HZMERG 0.27 
(0.51) 
0.26 
(0.47) 
0.24 
(0.46) 
0.05 
(0.10) 
-0.11 
(-0.05) 
-0.65 
(-0.32) 
CONGMERG -0.29 
(-1.07) 
-0.20 
-0.75 
LMERG -1.12 
(-0.81) 
-0.94 
(-1.01) 
NLMERG -0.16 
(-0.35) 
0.51 
(0.76) 
UMERG -0.27 
(-0.74) 
-0.27 
(-0.81) 
Degrees of 
freedom 187 185 187 185 78 78 
R2 
.15 .14 .21 .20 .30 .40 
t-ratios in parentheses. 
2 Significance levels (uppercase for 2-tailed tests, lowercase 
for 1-tailed tests): A,a - 1^ ; B,b - 5%; C,c - 10%. 
104 
99 industries 
with > 1 conglom­
erate merger 
50 industries 
with 1 conglom­
erate merger 
ACR-4 ACR-8 ACR-4 ACR-8 
—0.68 
(-0.69) 
-0.84 
(-0.82) 
0.18 
(0.17) 
0.24 
(0.22) 
-1.12 
(-1.01) 
-0.22 
(-0.19) 
3.31* 
(2.50) 
3.17^  
(2.22) 
2.93^  
(2.12) 
2.89^  
(1.90) 
3.01^  
(1.42) 
2.48 
(1.16) 
2.80 
(1.25) 
2.47 
(0.99) 
-1.08 
(-0.93) 
-1.05 
(-0.90) 
-2.46^  
(-2.00) 
-2.46^  
(-1.97) 
0.26 
(0.15) 
0.71 
(0.41) 
-1.97 
(-1.07) 
-2.08 
(-1.10) 
0.05 
(0.33) 
0.05 
(0.39) 
-0.01 
(-0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(-0.10) 
-0.04 
(-0.19) 
-0.26 
(-0.82) 
-0.30 
(-0.93) 
0.35 
(0.76) 
0.46 
(0.95) 
0.32 
(0.66) 
0.29 
(0.54) 
3.44^  
(1.96) 
4.53® 
(2.48). 
3.99® 
(2.16) 
4.42® 
(2.24) 
-0.29 
(-0.98) 
-0.29 
(-0.93) 
0.19 
(0.12) 
-0.57 
(-1.29) 
-0.11 
(-0.28) 
-0.23 
(-0.20) 
-0.20 
(-0.31) 
-0.35 
(-0.90) 
-2.00 
(-0.63) 
-5.42® 
(-2.39) 
-0.16 
(-0.13) 
-0.16 
(-0.06) 
-3.55 
(-0.86) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
93 91 93 91 45 43 45 43 
.05 .04 .06 .04 .11 .16 .14 .12 
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weakening or reversal of trends that otherwise were occurring in these 
industries. However, the previously observed very weak negative relation 
between conglomerate mergers and changes in industry concentration is 
essentially unchanged. 
3. Further analyses 
In the two previous subsections, there is no evidence reported that 
directly supports the hypothesis that conglomerate mergers may contribute 
to increases in industry concentration. In fact, there is found to be 
weak support for an opposite hypothesis; that conglomerate mergers are 
associated with decreases in industry concentration. Also, some of the 
results reported might suggest that the effects of such influences on 
concentration as entry of new firms and production of consumer goods 
are attenuated by the occurrence of conglomerate mergers. In this sub­
section attempts are made to explain these results, and to find evidence 
that would support or contradict the tentative conclusions based on them. 
The first results to be discussed concern the negative and insig­
nificant coefficients that accompany almost all conglomerate merger 
variables. The insignificance of the coefficients could, of course, 
simply indicate the absence of a significant relationship between con­
glomerate mergers and changes in industry concentration. This result 
would be consistent with analyses by Markham (1973), the FTC(1972), and 
Goldberg (1972; 1974). 
Another plausible explanation for the insignificant coefficients 
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would be the poor quality of the data available for such an analysis, as 
discussed in Chapter IV. While perhaps legitimate, this explanation 
carries the potential danger of encouraging a "believing is seeing" 
interpretation of whatever weak results do emerge. 
A third explanation is suggested by observing a plot of changes 
in industry concentration against the number of conglomerate mergers 
occurring in. those industries. For the sample used in this study, such 
a plot took on roughly the shape in Figure 1 below, reflecting the 
dampening relation referred to in Section A of this chapter. 
CHNGCR4(8) 
-i 1 1 1 1—I 1 1 1 1 1-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  1 1  
Number of conglomerate 
mergers (leading, non-
leading, uncertain, or 
total) 
Figure 1. Relation between change in concentration and number of 
conglomerate mergers in 193 manufacturing industries 
Data such as these might reasonably be expected to result in 
conglomerate merger coefficients insignificantly different from zero, 
especially if they indicate a heteroscedastic error term. Though het-
eroscedasticity in a multivariate model cannot definitely be Inferred 
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from such a bivariate plot, the plot does serve as a warning that such 
a problem might exist. If so, the resulting t-ratios may be biased 
downward, making it difficult for coefficients to pass statistical sig­
nificance tests. 
In order to get a better indication of whether heteroscedàsticity 
of the error term is a problem with the data, the model was estimated 
for the entire sample, and a plot was made of the regression residuals 
against the predicted values for the dependent variables. This rough 
analysis was sufficient to convince the author that an attempt to correct 
for heteroscedàsticity was in order, as the residuals were not apparently 
randomly distributed across the predicted values of the dependent vari­
ables. 
The first such attempt was made on the assumption that: 
Var (E\) = CX^ ,^ 
where is the error term of the model, C is a non-zero, positive 
constant, and is the number of conglomerate mergers plus one in 
industry i. The weighted least squares regression obtained by multi­
plying all variables in the model by would have a homoscedastic 
error term (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1981, pp. 145-46). However, estimation 
of the model following this adjustment did not increase the significance 
of the coefficients, and the plot of residuals against predicted values 
was not improved. 
A second attempt at correction for heteroscedàsticity, using as 
weights the estimated variance of each of three subgroups of the sample 
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(Maddala 1977, pp. 263-64), was likewise unsuccessful. (The three 
subgroups were determined by the groupings in the plot of residuals 
mentioned above.) At this point it was decided to simply live with 
whatever amount of heteroscedasticity the sample contains, and no further 
attempts to correct for heteroscedasticity were made. 
Of the theories discussed in Chapter II, only the theory of mutual 
forbearance might lead one to expect a dampening relation between con­
glomerate mergers and changes in industry concentration. The other 
theories suggest that conglomerate mergers may lead to increases or 
decreases in concentration, but the present study and prior empirical 
studies find little or no support for such theories, providing justifi­
cation for a laissez faire public policy toward conglomerate mergers. 
The policy implications of finding a dampening relation, though, would 
certainly be different than would results simply indicating no effect 
of conglomerate mergers on industry concentration. However, evidence 
of such a relation would not emerge if the positive and negative values 
of CHNGCR4 (8) at each level of conglomerate merger activity have the 
effect of "offsetting" each other in the estimation of a regression line. 
Two attempts are made to verify the existence of such a dampening rela­
tion, and both are generally successful. 
First, the original model is estimated using the absolute value 
of CHNGCR4(8) as the dependent variable. It is necessary to include 
the other independent variables in order to filter out influences on 
CHNGCR4(8) other than conglomerate merger activity. However, the use 
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of the absolute value of CHNGCR4(8) renders the control variable coeffi­
cients very difficult to interpret, and therefore they are not reported 
in Table 7. The hypothesis tested is that the coefficients on the con­
glomerate merger variables are negative, and so a one-tailed test for 
significance is appropriate. 
Table 7. Regression coefficients on conglomerate merger variables 
when using the absolute value of the change in CR-4 or 
CR-8 as the dependent variable 
193 industries 99 industries with 50 industries with 
> 1 conglomerate 1 conglomerate 
merger merger 
Independent 
variable |CR-4| |CR-8| |CR-4| |CR-8| |CR-4| |CR-8| 
CONGMERG -0.32* 
(-1.62) 
-0.42** 
(-2.10) 
-0.34** 
(-1.73) 
-0.37** 
(-1.81) 
L4(8)MERG -0.85 
(-0.81) 
-0.60 
(-0.82) 
-1.07 
(-1.03) 
-0.11 
(-0.14) 
-2.27 -0.15 
(-1.08) (-0.08) 
NL4(8)MERG -0.18 
(-0.52) 
-0.58 
(-1.14) 
-0.38* 
(-1.30) 
-0.84** 
(-1.95) 
-2.95** -7.01** 
(-1.69) (-1.96) 
D4(8)MERG -0.35* 
(-1.30) 
-0.31 
(-1.23) 
-0.25 
(-0.97) 
-0.19 
(-0.74) 
*Significant at 10% level (1-tailed test). 
** 
Significant at 5% level (1-tailed test). 
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In the 193- and 99-industry samples, the conglomerate merger vari­
ables are consistently negative. (See Table 7.) The coefficient on 
C0NGMER6 is significantly negative at the 5% level in three of four 
regressions, and extremely close to that level of significance in the 
fourth. The finer classification of mergers, into leading firm, non-
leading firm, and uncertain categories, yields one coefficient signifi­
cant at the 5% level (NL8MERG in the CR-8 regression on the 99-industry 
sample), and two coefficients significant at the 10% level (U4MERG and 
NL4MERG in the CR-4 regressions on the 193- and 99-industry samples, 
respectively). In the 50-industry sample, where the inclusion of three 
industry dummy variables prevents the use of CONGMERG and one of the 
three classes of conglomerate mergers, NL4(8)MERG is significantly neg­
ative at the 5% level, and L4(8)MERG is negative but Insignificant. 
Thus, all three industry samples lend some support to the exis­
tence of a dampening relation. The evidence suggests that all conglom­
erate mergers, but especially non-leading firm mergers, are associated 
with such an effect. Before trying to explain why such an effect may 
arise, one more piece of evidence supporting its existence is presented. 
A casual analysis of the descriptive statistics in Section A of 
this chapter and the regression results just reported would imply a 
negative g in the following model: 
= a + BX^ , 
where is the variance of CHNGCR4(8) and is the number of conglom­
erate mergers in industry i. In other words, the hypothesis is that 
Ill 
less variance in changes in concentration will be observed in industries, 
the more conglomerate merger activity those industries experience. A 
regression model is proposed to test this hypothesis. Lacking informa­
tion on the true variance of CHNGCR4(8) for each industry, it is neces­
sary to estimate variances for groups of industries. 
First, the sample of 193 industries was divided into groups con­
sisting of two or more industries, according to the number of conglom­
erate mergers occurring into each industry. There were nine such groups: 
industries with zero, one, two, three, four, five, seven, eight, or ten 
conglomerate mergers. Next, the variance of the change in CR-4 and CR-8 
was calculated for each group. This being done, a weighted least squares 
regression of the variance of the change in CR-4 and CR-8 on the number 
of conglomerate mergers was estimated using the number of Industries in 
each group as the weight. The results are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8. Regression of variance of change in concentration on number 
of conglomerate mergers: 193 industry sample^  
_2 Dependent Intercept C0N6MER6 R N 
variable 
Variance of CHNGCR4 68.67** -7.90* .50 9 
(10.96) (-2.99) 
** 
Variance of CHNGCR8 70.73 -8.18 .53 9 
(11.56) (-3.17) 
t^-ratios in parentheses. 
Significant at 5% level. 
** 
Significant at 1% level. 
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The significantly negative coefficients on the independent vari­
ables lead one to reject the null hypothesis of 3 = 0. In other words, 
these regressions lend support to the existence of a dampening relation. 
The evidence presented so far concerning the relationship between 
conglomerate mergers and changes in industry concentration can be sum­
marized as falling into three main categories: 
1) statistically insignificant negative coefficients on 
most conglomerate merger variables in the original 
regression equation, here to be referred to as the 
"insignificant coefficient" result; 
2) evidence from descriptive statistics and least squares 
regression results of a relation between conglomerate 
mergers and reduced changes in Industry concentration, 
whether increases or decreases (the dampening rela­
tion); and, 
3) weak evidence of an association between conglomerate 
mergers and the attenuation or reversal of the effects 
of other factors related to changes in industry con­
centration, here to be referred to as the "weakening 
relation." 
It might be the case that conglomerate acquisitions are most likely 
to occur into older, established industries. Such industries would be 
more apt than newer Industries to be near an "equilibrium concentration 
level," as determined by technological considerations, market size, entry 
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barriers, and other factors (Caves and Porter 1980, p. 2). Increases 
or decreases in concentration in these industries would then be expected 
to be smaller than in other industries. Â tendency for conglomerate 
mergers to occur more often into such industries would explain the 
observed dampening relation, with the direction of causation from the 
nature of the industry (and, hence, its minimal change in concentration) 
to the amount of conglomerate merger activity. The insignificant coeffi­
cient result would arise if the changes in concentration, though small, 
were on average negative. This could be due to the pursuit of short run 
profits by leading firms, at the expense of a gradual and small loss of 
their market shares to existing firms. It also seems reasonable that 
other factors that influence concentration would have less of an effect 
on such "mature" industries. If, in fact, conglomerate merger activity 
were concentrated in such industries, this would account for the apparecL 
weakening of the effect of such factors. 
To seek support for this line of reasoning, it was decided to 
regress the number of conglomerate mergers on several combinations of 
variables that might reflect the "maturity" of an Industry. ENTRY, 
CHNGSHIP, and CHCR467 were all thought to be related to the proximity 
of an industry to its equilibrium concentration level (assuming the 
existence of such an equilibrium). This relationship would be an 
inverse relationship for ENTRY and CHNGSHIP; therefore, if conglomerate 
mergers actually occurred more often into industries near their equi­
librium . level of concentration, those variables would have negative 
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coefficients in the regression results. If, on the other hand, conglom­
erate mergers occurred more often into fast-growing, relatively young 
industries, positive coefficients on ENTRY and CHNGSHIP would be expected. 
The coefficient sign on CHCR467 was not predicted, for the same reasons 
discussed when this variable was first explained. The results from 
this test on the sample of 193 industries are reported in Table 9. 
Table 9. Test for interpretation of dampening relation: "maturity" 
of industries experiencing conglomerate mergers^  
Dependent 
variable 
Intercept ENTRY CHNGSHIP CHCR467 R^  N 
C0NGMER6 1.43** 
(9.11) 
** 
1.08 
(2.98) 
-0.53 
(-1.52) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
.05 193 
CONGMERG 1.36** 
(9.02) 
0.85* 
(2.57) 
0.01 
(0.30) 
.03 193 
CONGMERG 1.46** 
(9.10) 
-0.10 
(-0.30) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
.001 193 
t^-ratios in parentheses. 
*Signifleant at 5% level. 
Significant at 1% level. 
Although this evidence is not unambiguous, it does not seem to 
provide much support for the hypothesis of more conglomerate merger 
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activity into "mature" Industries, and therefore such an interpretation 
of the results of this study is rejected. 
Another possible interpretation of the results would be that a 
disproportionate number of conglomerate mergers occurred into industries 
with very high levels of concentration and a large number of small 
"fringe" firms. Such industries would not provide much opportunity for 
further increases in concentration, and even rapid growth of small firms 
would not be expected to significantly decrease concentration. The 
small firms, though, might be attractive acquisition targets. 
Table 10. Test for interpretation of dampening relation: level of 
concentration of industries experiencing conglomerate 
mergers® 
Dependent Intercept CR-4 CR-8 CR-4 CR-8 R^  N 
variable 1967 1967 1972 1972 
CONGMERG 
** 
1.89 
(5.90) 
-0.01 
(-1.58) 
.01 193 
CONGMERG 1.81** 
(4.99) 
-0.01 
(-1.13) 
.01 193 
CONGMERG 2.02 
(6.26) 
* 
-0.01 
(-2.03) 
.02 193 
CONGMERG 1.93** 
(5.18) 
-0.01 
(-1.43) 
.01 193 
t^-ratios in parentheses. 
* 
Significant at 5% level. 
** 
Significant at 1% level. 
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This explanation, too, was refuted, in this case by regressing the 
number of conglomerate mergers in each industry on the CR-4 and CR-8 
for 1967 and 1972 in four separate regressions (Table 10). All of the 
concentration variables have negative coefficients; one of them, CR-4 
in 1972, is significant at the 5% level. Thus, a tendency for conglom­
erate mergers into less concentrated industries emerged. 
A third interpretation of the results relates to the theory of 
mutual forbearance discussed previously. If such behavior between 
large diversified firms develops as a result of their entry via merger 
into the same Industries, the tempering of competitive behavior could 
result in both the dampening and weakening relations. The insignificant 
coefficients on the conglomerate merger variables are entirely consistent 
with this explanation. Although the results of this study can hardly 
be considered as convincing support for the theory of mutual forbearance, 
the evidence has not led the author to a compelling alternative explana­
tion. 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. Summary 
Chapter I of this dissertation presented a brief overview of the 
nature of conglomerate mergers. The extent of conglomerate merger 
activity in recent years and some potential effects of conglomerate 
mergers were also discussed in Chapter I. 
Chapter II began a more narrowly focused examination of some 
possible effects of conglomerate mergers on competition in individual 
industrial markets. To this end, the economic significance of market 
concentration was briefly reviewed, followed by a more detailed explana­
tion of how conglomerate mergers might affect market concentration. In 
particular, it was explained how a conglomerate acquisition might result 
in practices that can affect the market share of the acquired firm, 
which, in turn, might affect concentration in the market of the acquired 
firm. The practices that were of interest for this study were reciprocal 
buying agreements, cross-subsidization, and mutual forbearance. To the 
extent that reciprocity and cross-subsidization occur and have the 
intended effect, they would result in an increased market share for an 
acquired firm. In contrast, mutual forbearance is more likely to 
maintain or protect a firm's market share. The effects of successful 
reciprocity and cross-subsidization on market concentration were shown 
to differ, according to the market position of the acquired firm at the 
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time of acquisition, and depending upon the source of any increase in 
that firm's market share. 
Previous studies (Markham 1973; FTC 1972; Goldberg 1972, 1974) 
that investigated the possible relationship between conglomerate mergers 
and changes in industry concentration were reviewed in Chapter III. The 
studies did not find support for allegations that conglomerate mergers 
are associated with increases in concentration, and found either weak 
evidence or no evidence relating conglomerate mergers to decreases in 
concentration. Shortcomings in each of these studies were identified. 
In Chapter IV, a model was suggested for the purpose of drawing 
inferences regarding the practices of reciprocity, cross-subsidization, 
and mutual forbearance subsequent to conglomerate mergers. Like the 
studies discussed in Chapter III, the approach was to indirectly infer 
the extent of such practices by analyzing the relationship between con­
glomerate mergers and changes in industry concentration. It was hoped 
that by controlling for other factors that could affect changes in con­
centration, and by employing data unavailable to previous researchers, 
some light would be shed on the effects, if any, of conglomerate mergers 
on the competitive behavior of acquired firms. Data used for estimation 
of the model and the severe limitations of those data were also described 
in Chapter IV. 
The results of the empirical analysis of this study were presented 
in Chapter V. First, a series of descriptive statistics were presented. 
These statistics showed that there was very little ch^ ge in the average 
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level of concentration (CR-4 and CR-8) between 1967 and 1977 in the 193 
industries studied. However, the evidence showed trends toward increasing 
concentration in consumer-goods industries and slightly decreasing con­
centration in producer-goods industries (though the combined market 
share of the fifth through the eighth largest firms in producer-goods 
industries was increasing during the period)• This evidence is generally 
consistent with prior studies of earlier time periods by Mueller and 
Hamm (1974), Scherer (1979), and Caves and Porter (1980). 
The descriptive statistics also showed that conglomerate merger 
activity did not seem significantly more likely to occur in consumer-
goods industries than in producer-goods Industries. What is notable, 
however, is that industries experiencing conglomerate mergers seem to 
have exhibited smaller increases and smaller decreases in concentration 
compared to industries with zero conglomerate mergers; this was referred 
to as the dampening relation between conglomerate mergers and changes 
in industry concentration. 
Evidence from ordinary least-squares multiple regression estimation 
of the model was presented next in Chapter V. The evidence did not 
provide support for theories suggesting that conglomerate mergers lead 
to increases in industry concentration, and only very weak or statisti­
cally insignificant evidence was found relating conglomerate mergers to 
decreases in industry concentration. Some evidence suggested that con­
glomerate mergers are associated with the weakening of factors that, in 
the absence of such mergers, seem to affect changes in concentration. 
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The existence of the apparent dampening relation observed in the 
descriptive statistics was supported by some further regression analyses. 
Two possible explanations suggested for such a relationship were tested, 
but these explanations were not supported by the simple tests used. 
B. Conclusions and Implications 
The controversy of the past two decades in regard to public policy 
toward conglomerate mergers has had a variety of emphases, including 
the effects of such mergers on aggregate concentration, production 
efficiency, the quality of market information, and the dispersion of 
political power. The results of this study do not have direct bearing 
on the debates surrounding these considerations. Rather, this study's 
results have implications germane to the question of the effects of con­
glomerate mergers on the subsequent competitive behavior of firms 
involved in such mergers. As such, any policy implications of the 
present study should be thought of as relating to but one aspect of 
the effects of conglomerate mergers, and public policy with respect to 
conglomerate mergers must necessarily be formed on the basis of a 
broader range of considerations. It is from the limited perspective 
of this study that the following conclusions and implications are 
suggested. 
In Chapter III, it was noted that Mueller (1977) had, perhaps 
prematurely, determined that "A fair consensus exists that conglomerate 
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mergers have not.contributed to increases in industry level concentra­
tion ..." (p. 336). This study certainly adds to that consensus. On 
that basis, it can be cautiously inferred that reciprocity and cross-
subsidization are not used by most conglomerates to increase the market 
shares of acquired leading firms. On the other hand, there was found 
very little evidence in support of the possibility that conglomerate 
firms contribute to decreases in concentration by using reciprocity 
and cross-subsidization to increase the market shares of acquired non-
leading firms. These results are consistent with the findings by the 
FTC (1972) that "From a competitive standpoint, the effects of conglom­
erate diversification ... appear to be largely neutral" (p. 86, emphasis 
in the original). Thus, this study provides no support for restricting 
or encouraging conglomerate mergers on the grounds that such mergers 
may result in the practices of reciprocity or cross-subsidization. 
The finding in this study of an apparent dampening relation 
between conglomerate mergers and changes in industry concentration, 
however, implies that conglomerate mergers might not be neutral with 
respect to changes in concentration or, by Inference, with respect to 
the competitive behavior of firms involved in conglomerate mergers. If 
such a relation does, in fact, exist, it is important to determine its 
fundamental nature. 
One possible explanation of a dampening relation is the attitude 
of mutual forbearance that Edwards (1955; 1970) has suggested might 
develop between large diversified firms. Such an attitude conflicts 
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with the competitive behavior that most economic theory requires for 
the efficient operation of markets. It should be noted that if con­
glomerate mergers, by fostering an attitude of mutual forbearance, 
result in less increases in concentration, as the dampening relation 
would suggest, such a development should not be considered beneficial. 
Industry concentration is only intended as a proxy for the degree of 
competition, and no one would contend that it is the sole determinant 
of the degree of competition in an industry. If direct evidence of 
reduced competition exists, it is such evidence that public policy 
should reflect, regardless of evidence indicating no Increase in con­
centration in the affected market. Therefore, if widespread evidence 
of mutual forbearance could be found, such evidence would combine with 
the results of this study to support a policy to slow or reverse the 
emergence of large, diversified firms; restraints on certain conglomerate 
mergers would be one way of contributing to that result. 
Of course, other explanations of the observed dampening relation 
are possible, although to this point the author has not found compelling 
alternatives to the mutual forbearance explanation. In any case, the 
evidence suggests that further research in this regard is required before 
the effects of conglomerate mergers on industry concentration, and on the 
competitive behavior of firms involved in conglomerate mergers,^ should 
be declared with any confidence to be "largely neutral." 
The call for further research into the effects of conglomerate 
mergers necessarily leads to another conclusion that is, admittedly, not 
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unique to this study. That conclusion is that significant improvements 
in the publicly available data base for industrial organization research 
are necessary before such research can provide a reliable basis for 
industrial policy decisions. To cite just one of many possibilities, 
publication of the profitability (uniformly calculated) and the shares 
of sales of individual firms in economically meaningful markets would 
greatly improve the ability to test the validity of various hypothe­
sized industry structure/conduct/performance relationships. It would 
seem that the marginal cost of making such data available, in terms of 
resources used and infringement of "privacy rights," would be far out­
weighed by the additional gain in understanding of the complex operation 
of a market economy. A substantially improved data base would not 
ensure the final resolution of positive controversies surrounding indus­
trial organization theory, much less resolve the normative questions 
concerning appropriate public policy; debate on both fronts would undoubt­
edly remain vigorous. Nevertheless, the qualitative level of such 
debates would certainly be raised by data that would reduce or eliminate 
the need for "doubly-indirect inference" approaches such as that used 
in the present study. 
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